*The Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc.*

31 MAY 1916

## *THE BATTLE OF*


# JUTLAND



British Grand Fleet



German High Seas Fleet




**John C Date**

# JUTLAND

The Battle of Jutland, so named by the British after the nearby island of Jutland, the northern part of Denmark, but named by the Germans as the Battle of Skagerrak, being off that area of water between Denmark and Norway. The colossal confrontation of battleships remains one of the most fascinating sea battles of all time, for the result was a baffling paradox, the Germans scored more material successes but it was to no advantage and the British Fleet continued to reign supreme. British Naval strategy at the time rested on the retention of sea supremacy and while the policy of the British Naval Command was to bring the German Main Fleet to action and annihilate it if possible, there was no intention to gamble with an engagement in waters where mines, submarines and shore defences could give the enemy a definite advantage, nor under conditions where the outcome would be largely dependent on chance, such as a Fleet night action. This now is a summary and historical review of the Battle of Jutland. Clarified for your easy appreciation of the event, re-styled in the mass of detail that characterised this great sea battle and presented briefly with illustrations for your quick assimilation. All Naval movements and action times remain completely factual. The British tradition governed tactics of a "Single Line Ahead" battle formation, with battleships powerfully armed, at the sacrifice of armour and speed. Battle-cruisers were designed with superior speed to enable them to reconnoitre in the face of the enemy and this is exactly what happened at Jutland.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO 1. NORTH SEA OPERATIONS*


BRITISH GRAND FLEET - Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe (C-in-C)
Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty (battle-cruisers)

GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET - Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer (C-in-C)
Vice Admiral Von Hipper (battle-cruisers)


A German plan was initiated for the battle-cruisers, commanded by Hipper to sail via the Skagerrak, so that by showing themselves off the Norwegian coast, they would draw some of the British Forces in that direction. Scheer hoped to meet the British Fleet, in piecemeal fashion, first to be engaged by the 5 battle-cruisers and then to be caught in a pincer movement with his High Seas Fleet following 50 miles to the south, of 16 Dreadnought Battleships, 6 Pre-Dreadnought ships, plus 5 light cruisers and 39 destroyers led by a light cruiser. Let us at this point take note of the meaning of "Dreadnought Battleships" and also that of "battle-cruisers". Around the turn of the century, the heavy or capital ship had been referred to as the "Ironclad battleships" but with the commissioning in 1906 of HMS DREADNOUGHT, heavily armed, extra armour plating and turbine engines giving her a speed of up to 27 knots, she became a ship inferior to none, superior to all, dreading nothing and so called "DREADNOUGHT". Ships were later described as pre Dreadnought ie pre 1906, or Dreadnoughts of after that era. Then came the "battle cruiser", an offshoot of the Battleship which had a greater speed at the sacrifice of armour plating, so designed to act as a scouting battle force.

From a German cruiser sunk in the Baltic, the Russians had salvaged the German secret code which was passed on to Britain. Here was a tremendous breakthrough, but unfortunately it was not used to full advantage. On 30 May 1916, the Admiralty intercepted a message from Scheer ordering his Fleet to sea and later that day, at 5.40 pm, Jellicoe was ordered to concentrate his Fleet westward of the "Long Forties", a position 110 miles east off Aberdeenshire. Beatty with his Flag in the battle-cruiser LION, a force of 6 battle-cruisers, 4 Dreadnoughts, 14 light cruisers and 27 destroyers, sailed from the Firth of Forth to join Jellicoe's Battle Fleet of 24 Dreadnoughts, 3 battle-cruisers, 8 armoured cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 5 destroyer leaders, 46 destroyers, a seaplane carrier and a minelayer, the next day at 2 pm off Jutland Bank and if otherwise not informed, to stand towards the main fleet to get in visual communication. (Lat 5l deg 45 mins

## Illustration Nº1




## Illustration Nº2



N/Long 0.4 deg 15 min E.) At 8.l9 am the sighting of a submarine caused Beatty to alter course 90 deg to port, for some 18 minutes, a detour which added some 6 miles to the distance to be travelled. At 10.10 am, Beatty made a decision that was to cost him dearly a few hours later, by ordering the 5th Battle Squadron to take station on a compass bearing NW and distant 5 miles from his Flagship, LION. It was incomprehensible why such a position was nominated for this powerful Force when the most probable direction for first sighting the enemy was obviously easterly or southeasterly! This was exactly what did eventuate and Beatty endeavoured to cut off the enemy by a course SE, this action being fully approved by Jellicoe. However, having made the fatal and elementary mistake of dividing his Forces produced results which can only be described as disastrous.

Meanwhile, the German Fleet left the Jade River, Wilhelmshaven, between 2 and 2.30 am of 31 May, preceded by Hipper's First Scouting Group headed for the Norwegian coast, there to rendezvous with Scheer's Battle Fleet the next morning. Zeppelin reconnaissance saw nothing of the British Forces and so the German Admiral had at this time no suspicion that the British Fleet was at sea and steaming towards him. At about this time, at 11.10 am, Jellicoe had been mistakenly advised that the German Battle Fleet was still in harbour! Both Admirals were thus sailing towards each other in ignorance of the presence of the other's main Forces. At 2.15 pm, the light cruiser GALATEA (Arethusa Class 3,750 tons), in company with PHAETON, 17 miles distant from Beatty's Flagship LION, sighted the Danish steamer N J FJORD and proceeded to investigate, at the same time as two German destroyers, one the ELBING, were checking the same sighting.


At 2.28 pm, GALATEA and PHAETON opened fire and the first phase of Jutland had begun. At 2.35 pm, GALATEA reported that she had sighted a large amount of smoke, as though from a Fleet, bearing ENE. These were Hipper's battle-cruisers coming to the westward at high speed, to give support. Also at 2.15 pm, Beatty's battle-cruisers altered course to the SE. The signal could not be distinguished by the battleship BARHAM, Flagship of the 5th Battle Squadron, leaving her out of sight 10 miles.

*RELATIVE TO ILLUSTRATION NO.1.*


Admiral Jellicoe and Battleship IRON DUKE (Flagship)
Vice Admiral Beatty and Battle-Cruiser LION (Flagship)
Vice Admiral Scheer & Vice Admiral Von Hipper
Flagships Battleship IRON DUKE 25,000 tons, 21 knots, 10 x 13.5", 12 x 6"
Battleship FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE 24,700 tons, 20 knots, 10 x 12", 14 x 5.9"
Battleship MOLTKE 22,640 tons, 27 knots, 10 x 11", 12 x 5.9"
Fleet Lists

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.2. (2.45 TO 4.05 PM) BEGINNING OF THE RUN TO THE SOUTH.*
At 2.45 pm, a seaplane was despatched from the British seaplane-carrier ENGADINE, but to no avail as the plane could see little of the enemy and after half an hour, had to descend on account of engine trouble. Hipper had sighted and identified Beatty's battle-cruisers in the brighter light to the west and now turned his Squadron 180o to the southward, for the purpose of falling back on the support of his Battle Fleet and also to draw the battle-cruisers within their reach. Beatty at the same time, rather than wait for the 5th Battle Squadron to join him, endeavoured to keep between the enemy and his base and formed a line of battle in the order of LION, PRINCESS ROYAL, QUEEN MARY, TIGER, NEW ZEALAND and INDEFATIGABLE, all NW of LION; and ordering R/A Evans-Thomas with his 5th Battle Squadron to come east at 25 knots. The sea was relatively calm as fire was opened at 3.45 pm from both sides practically simultaneously, with LUTZOW seen to fire first at 16,000 yards, approximately 8 nautical miles.

## Illustration N°3




## Illustration N°4



The British ships over estimated the range initially, which permitted the German gunners to withhold fire until the range was more to their suiting, although superiority was 6 to 5 in Beatty's favour. Within 3 minutes, LION was hit by 2 shells from LUTZOW, PRINCESS ROYAL by 2 shells from DERFFLINGER and TIGER by 4 shells from MOLTKE. At about 4.00 pm, LION was further badly hit in "Q" turret and only the prompt action of Maj Harry RM, in ordering the flooding of the magazines, no doubt saved the ship and this action on his part won him a posthumous VC. Another hit on LION destroyed the wireless transmitter, so that thereafter Beatty's signals had to be sent visually to PRINCESS ROYAL, next in line, for relay, which proved a great disadvantage in the ensuing battle. At 3.55 pm, at a range of 12,900 yards, QUEEN MARY obtained hits on SEYDLITZ. The first major disaster struck at 4.02 pm when the rear ships of each opposing battle line, INDEFATIGABLE and VON DER TANN engaged in a duel, with 3 shells hitting INDEFATIGABLE and causing an internal explosion (no doubt the magazine) and another salvo quickly sent her to the bottom with only 2 survivors from a total of 957 ship's company. At last, at 4.08 pm, the 5th Battleship Squadron opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards, which now began to steadily take toll. VON DER TANN was hit heavily and the accuracy and rapidity of fire of the enemy began to depreciate considerably. This now allowed Beatty some respite.


**REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.3 (4.20 TO 4.38 PM). THE RUN TO THE SOUTH**

At about 4.25 pm, destroyers on both sides instigated attacks, the British 5th Battleship Squadron avoided 12 torpedoes and Beatty's force 6 torpedoes, by turning away 22 deg for a few minutes, but the German battle-cruiser SEYDLITZ was hit, although able to remain in line. The Germans were to lose 2 destroyers, V27 and V29 and the British 2 destroyers, NOMAD and NESTOR. At 4.26 pm, the battle-cruiser QUEEN MARY was next victim. She received multiple hits from DERFFLINGER, which must have penetrated the magazine and caused her to blow apart, cave in and sink instantaneously. Of 1,266 ship's company, only 17 survived. This caused Beatty to make his famous understatement as he turned to his Captain: "There's something wrong with our bloody ships today, Chatfield". At about 4.38 pm, the light cruiser SOUTHAMPTON, Flagship of Commodore Goodenough of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and reported Scheer's Battle Fleet and pressed on to within 13,000 yards of the enemy to report accurate information and disposition of the enemy, a most commendable effort. The electrifying turn of events must have come as a great surprise to both Jellicoe and Beatty, who had been advised that the Fleet was still at Jade. The original advice was seen now to be obviously incorrect.


**REFER ILLUUSTRATION NO.4 (4.45 PM). HIGH SEAS FLEET IN SIGHT.**

Beatty now turned his battle-cruisers back 180 deg to draw the enemy eastward and to prevent him sighting Jellicoe approaching at a speed of 20 knots with his 6 columns each of 4 ships, totalling 24 battleships and covering a front of nearly 4 miles. The flag signals were not clear to the oncoming 5th Battle Squadron, who only turned after seeing Beatty's ships heading northward and so completed their position astern of the battle-cruisers, bringing them under fire by the enemy, with the Flagship BARHAM being hit. Hipper then turned his Force about to be in the van of Scheer, although SEYDLITZ was to experience further superficial damage from a torpedo hit. Scheer at this stage still believed Beatty's Force was only an isolated squadron. At 5.l2 pm Beatty ceased firing, being out of sight of the enemy, but BARHAM, VALIANT, WARSPITE and MALAYA carried on a running duel and even at the great range of 19,000 yards, inflicted considerable damage on the German battle-cruisers and battleships until about 5.40 pm. Regrettably Beatty did not report the position of Scheer's ships, which at this critical moment would have been of inestimable help to Jellicoe in deciding his Fleet's placing to best advantage, for premature deployment could be just as disadvantageous as late deployment.

## Illustration Nº5




## Illustration Nº6



*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.5 (5.40 PM TO 6.14 PM). THE RUN TO THE NORTH.*

At 5.36 pm the British Cruiser CHESTER, which had strayed easterly in its' endeavour to locate and join Beatty, became involved in a clash with the German 2nd Cruiser Scouting Group and was only saved by the intervention of the 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron led by the Flagship INVINCIBLE (R/A Hood) followed by INFLEXIBLE and INDOMITABLE and it was on the cruiser CHESTER that John Travers Cornwall, First-class boy of 16½ years was to receive the VC for remaining at his gun when the rest of the gun's crew had been killed. Even though visibility was worsening as evening drew on, these 3 battle-cruisers had the slight advantage for the first time of light being behind Hipper's ships and immediately inflicted crippling hits on LUTZOW, reducing the light cruiser WIESBADEN to a wreck and seriously damaging the light cruiser PILLAU.


Thus ended the battle-cruiser opening fleet action, as Jellicoe said in his despatch: "Result cannot be other than unpalatable". Beatty had 4 battleships and 6 battle-cruisers against Hipper's 5 battle-cruisers and was also numerically superior in cruisers and destroyers. In spite of this overwhelming preponderance of power, the British lost 2 battle-cruisers without any loss of battle-cruisers to the enemy.
The most obvious reasons for this regrettable result are:

(a) The delay in bringing the 5th Battle Squadron into action.
(b) Inferiority in projectiles; when later it was established shells had hit the German ships but failed to explode.


in cloudy weather usually prevailing in the North Sea, in this case aggravated by much smoke already saturating the local sea area and when course and speed have to be continually altered in the presence of the enemy, it is too much to expect that any ship would know her geographical position with absolute accuracy. Small errors, some way or another are usually cancelled if several reports are received. Hence the necessity of continuous and reliable reports. Also, it was desirable for Jellicoe to deploy his ships outside the 15,000 yard range of the enemy's torpedoes to play his advantage of superior gun armament. The only reliable advice had been the initial report of Scheer's Fleet by the cruiser SOUTHAMPTON. Authentic reports of the position of the enemy could have been sent at regular intervals by the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron, but no report was sent from this source. Jellicoe suffered a grave disadvantage of communications, with visibility now restricted to 12,000 yards or 6 miles. At 6.01 pm Jellicoe made a visual signal to Beatty: "Where is enemy's Battle Fleet?" At 6.10 pm he repeated the signal and at 6.14 pm the reply was received: "Have sighted enemy's Battle Fleet bearing SSW". But the message lacked the all important requirement on the course of the enemy.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.6. (6.15 PM). WINDY CORNER.*
At 6.15 pm while still out of sight of the enemy, Jellicoe exercised sound logic and deployed on his port wing column, which was led by the battleship KING GEORGE V, to where it was anticipated the enemy would appear. Jellicoe in his despatch states: "It was apparent on meeting, that the reckoning of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet (under Beatty) was about 12 miles to the eastward of IRON DUKE's reckoning. In consequence of this, the enemy were sighted on the starboard bow instead of ahead and some 20 minutes earlier than was expected". At this time, the disabled German light cruiser WIESBADEN was attacked by the British heavy cruisers DEFENCE and WARRIOR, with the destroyer ONSLOW finally hitting her with a torpedo. However, the British cruisers came under the full attack of Rear Admiral Behnche's 5th Division of 4 battleships led by KONIG and Hipper's scarred forces, with DEFENCE being sunk and WARRIOR badly damaged, later to sink whilst under tow by ENGADINE. The battleship WARSPITE made 3 complete turns as a result of her helm jamming. She was hit by shell fire, severely damaged and forced to retire.

## Illustration Nº7



## Illustration Nº8



*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.7 (6.17 - 6.40 PM). SCHEER WITHDRAWS.*

First Gunnery Officer of the German battle-cruiser DERFFLINGER, Commander Georg Von Hase, stated that at 6.11 pm it was almost impossible to sight the British as a result of dense smoke from the guns and funnels continually blurring the lenses of the fore-control periscopes, having then to reply upon visual observation of the Spotting Officer, Lt Cmdr Von Stosch. While Jelllcoe faced the task of moving his battle-cruisers to the van, which caused some delay and loss of advantage, Scheer had his daunting problems, at 6.36 pm, of facing the fact that his course had been crossed in a 'T' fashion, the worst situation possible in his present predicament and so was forced to make his famous "battle turn away", called 'gefechtskehtwendung", of his whole Fleet together in a complete turn of 180o from a course of NNE to SSW, while sheltering behind a destroyer attack and smoke screen. At 6.17 pm, as the two great Battle Fleets converged, the British Dreadnought MARLBOROUGH, Flagship of Vice Admiral Burney, opened fire, quickly followed by other ships. At 6.32 pm, Beatty and Hood's battle-cruisers concentrated their fire on Hipper's battle-cruisers LUTZOW and DERFFLINGER and the leading battleships led by KONIG, but at 6.34 pm a salvo from DERFFLINGER at 10,500 yards hit INVINCIBLE, which blew up and sank in two halves. Only 6 survived from a ship's company of 1,034. With LUTZOW now badly damaged from further hits, Hipper transferred to the battle-cruiser MOLTKE, which was executed around 7.00 pm.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.8. (6.44 - 7.05 PM). GEFECHTS KEHRTWENDUNG.*

At 6.44 pm, Jellicoe turned the Battle Fleet to the SE, this being the best course to ensure getting fair between the enemy and his base and at the same time, to close the enemy obliquely for the purpose of renewing the action. Lack of advice from his forward ships again hampered Jellicoe in knowing the exact movements of the enemy and in turn what counter action was required on his part. At 6.54 pm, MARLBOROUGH was struck by a torpedo, which was probably fired by the damaged WIESBADEN. This caused considerable damage, forcing her to reduce speed, but still able to maintain her position In the line. At 6.55 pm, Goodenough in SOUTHAMPTON, with his light cruisers who had steamed further south was rewarded by seeing and reporting that Scheer was again executing a turn-about manoeuvre to set him on an ESE course, probably thinking he could cross the rear of the British Fleet to face disaster for the second time.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.9. (7.15 - 7.22 PM) GRAND FLEET THRUSTS BACK SCHEER'S ATTACK.*

At 7.l2 pm, for the second time Jellicoe found himself crossing Scheer's 'T' at a range of only 10,000 yards. LUTZOW was blasted by two Dreadnoughts, later to be sunk and all the lead ships received a heavy battering. The British ships pounded the enemy at ranges between 11,000 and 14,000 yards, but owing to the poor visibility organised concentration of fire was impossible, which saved the German Fleet from almost certain defeat. Scheer, realising his passage to the eastward was barred, laid a smokescreen and in desperation ordered his battle-cruisers to *"durchhalten" - "charge the enemy, ram, without regard to circumstances"*, in what the Germans called a death ride. For the second time, Scheer ordered his Battle Fleet to *"battle turn away"* - *"gefechtskehrtwendung"* and later recalled the battle-cruisers under the protection of smoke screens, to cover his retreat. At 7.22 pm a melee between destroyer groups forced Jellicoe to turn 22½O and then again 22½O to avoid torpedoes, to an easterly course. Again, British ships failed to communicate advice of the enemy movements to Jellicoe, who now resumed a southerly course, later more westerly, in the endeavour to locate the enemy. In any case, he held the strategic advantage for he lay in the way of a German escape to the east and only had to wait for dawn to renew the encounter in daylight.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.10. (1.40 - 8.40 PM). LULL.*

At 7.40 pm, Beatty was 5¼ miles ahead and out of sight of the British battleships, but in the variable weather conditions, did report the enemy 10 to 11 miles NW by W and suggested the

**Illustration Nº9**





**Illustration Nº10**



battleships follow him. In the confusion of his signal, nothing resulted. At 8.00 pm, Beatty turned his ship west and the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron led by FALMOUTH (Rear Admiral Napier) was engaged In a brief cruiser action and at 8.23 pm the enemy's main Battle Fleet led by WESTFALEN and followed by the 2nd Squadron (POSEN) and pre-Dreadnought battleships came into action for a few minutes with Beatty's battle-cruisers, before the German ships turned away to the westward. Much criticism has been levelled at the British Scouting Forces for not keeping Jellicoe better informed, especially at this point of time, for knowing the enemy's exact movements, he could have turned to an interception course with Scheer. So an opportunity was let slip, never to return.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.11. (8.30 - 9.01 PM). TWILIGHT CONTACTS.*
At 9.01 pm Jellicoe's Battle Fleet was turned to the south and subsequently assumed night cruising formation. At 9.27 pm the destroyer flotillas took station 5 mIles astern. At 9.30 pm, Beatty pursued a similar course 12 miles on the starboard bow of IRON DUKE. Despatches later clarified Jellicoe and Beatty as of a similar mind, to avoid a night action between capital ships, because of the impossibility of distinguishing between friendly and enemy ships and the real danger of torpedo craft attack.

There were three routes the enemy could take:

(1) The northern one by Horn's Reef
(2) The southern one near the Frisian coast
(3) An intermediate one approaching Heligoland from the west.

Beatty placed his battle-cruisers ahead to cover the southern escape route. The destroyer flotil las astern covered any penetration of the enemy to Heligoland. Throughout the battle, cruisers were active just as they had been intended, scouting for the Battle Fleet and leading destroyers in attacks against the enemy battle line, proving themselves tough ships and capable of taking punishment and continuing. There were no fewer than 34 cruisers of all kinds on the British side and 11 on the German side.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.12. (9.05 - 10.20 PM). FORMATION FOR THE NIGHT.*
At about 9.05 pm, some ships believed to be enemy battle-cruisers were sighted by the 4th Squadron light cruisers ROYALIST and CAROLINE and also by the 11th Flotilla led by the light cruiser CASTOR. Some doubt existed as to the identification of these vessels and whether an attack was instigated as CAROLINE was ordered only to attack after positive identification. Again at 10.00 pm, CASTOR was challenged and then fired upon but decided not to fire their torpedoes in return in the belief that they may be British Cruisers. Between 9.00 and 10.00 pm, in flashing lamp signals, PRINCESS ROYAL requested the challenge and reply now in force, as theirs had been lost. The reply came back from LION and there is no reason why it should not have also been read by the enemy! All these incidents vindicated Jellicoe's earlier decision to avoid a night action as it would prove impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. Just after 9.00 pm the British Admiralty had intercepted messages stating:

(1) Scheer's new course to the east
(2) A request from Scheer for airship reconnaissance near Horn's Reef at daybreak.

Here was clear indication of Scheer's intentions and vital information which would have caused Jellicoe to entirely alter his plans during the night. But it was deemed sufficient only to advise him of the course and speed of the enemy and this advice about 1½ hours later at 11.05 pm, was a lack of appreciation of urgency and for the C-in-C to know the enemy's intentions and to take appropriate action. Also, as the position given by the Admiralty message did not agree with his understood position of the Fleets, Jellicoe was unable to act with any certainty. At 10.20 pm, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron led by SOUTHAMPTON came into action with enemy ships and

**Illustration N°11**






**Illustration N°12**



the German light cruiser FRAUENLOB was to sink later, as a result. As usual, SOUTHAMPTON sent a report of the enemy's position to Jelllcoe, but owing to wireless damage the message was not received until an hour later!

An ensuing number of confrontations did occur with the enemy - for example:

(1) At 11.45 pm, an incident of the destroyer SPITFIRE going to the assistance of the destroyer TIPPERARY which had been badly damaged, actually crossed the stern of the German Leadship WESTFALEN and then rammed the German Dreadnought battleship NASSAU, which, owing to the proximity of the ships, her guns could not be depressed sufficiently and all but two shots passed over the destroyer.

(2) Strange ships sighted by the cruiser CHAMPION and the destroyer OBDURATE, but no effort was made to identify them and as they were probably enemy, a positional report could have been of immense importance.


(3) At 11.30 pm, a message from the light cruiser BIRMINGHAM of sighting and giving the position of enemy battle-cruisers, but Jelllcoe was unable to reconcile the position as correct, for he was not to know that BIRMINGHAM had strayed to a position close to the starboard quarter of the 5th Battle Squadron.

(4) The battleship MALAYA of the 5th Battle Squadron wanted to open fire on an enemy battleship of the WESTFALEN Class but was refused by her Captain as Rear Admiral Evans-Thomas had not previously authorised it and no warning signals were transmitted to Jellicoe. Had such advice been sent, the German Fleet could still have been brought to action at daylight.

*REFER ILLUSTRATION NO.13. (10.40 - 2.30 AM) NIGHT.*
(GERMAN FLEET PASSING THROUGH THE REAR OF THE BRITISH FLEET.)
While Jellicoe viewing from IRON DUKE, could hear firing and see gun flashes astern, to be expected from destroyer and cruiser flotillas, there was nothing to indicate enemy battleships or battle-cruisers were in action. However at 10.46 pm, Jellicoe signalled the light cruiser CHESTER, asking if she was engaging enemy destroyers and in reply only mentioned engaging enemy cruisers. In the heat and turmoil of night actions, while destroyers are under heavy fire, being separated from their leaders, experiencing collisions and other distracting incidents, it is to be expected that individual Captains of destroyers would have little time to think of sending messages reporting the enemy. It would naturally appear to them that what they saw, their leaders also witnessed.

At 12.30 am the armoured cruiser BLACK PRINCE closed the rear of the 1st Division of the enemy Battle Fleet and was sunk at point-blank range. At 1.43 am OBEDIENT of the 12th Destroyer Flotilla sighted 6 enemy battleships of the German 2nd DivisIon and FAULKNER, leading the flotilla, attacked immediately. The destroyer ONSLAUGHT was badly hit but a torpedo hit was obtained on the German battleship POMMERN which was to split in two and sink later with the loss of her 844 ship's company. Two positional reports were sent but unfortunately were not received by IRON DUKE, no doubt due to a malfunction of the wireless in FAULKNER. Even the 4th Flotilla, in action at the same time, failed to advise Jellicoe of their engagement with enemy Dreadnoughts. At 2.30 am, Jellicoe ordered his Battle Fleet to alter course to the north in line of battle in case of meeting the enemy. Shortly after, the Admiralty advised that directional wireless placed the enemy 11 miles from Horn's Reef, whereas the British Fleet was still that distance away, so it was useless to attempt to overtake the enemy. Jellicoe's cause in the immediate context, was lost for two main reasons, neither of which was within his control.

**ILLUSTRATION Nº13**






31st May 1916

Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe died in November 1935 and Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty in March 1936.

Both were given state funerals and buried in St Pauls Cathedral, London, with solemn, pomp and naval honours

Vice Admiral Reinhard Von Scheer died in 1928 and Vice Admiral Von Hipper in 1932, being buried near their homes in Germany.

For all the heroism and suffering of both sides, in the end many men had perished for very little.



SMS LUTZOW
sunk at the Battle of Jutland

1) The failure on the part of the Admiralty to fully advise without delay of the known enemy intentions.
2) Failure by the ships astern to advise him that the enemy Battle Fleet was crossing behind, it being accepted practice to advise the C-in-C of the enemy's movements at all times.


The German Fleet passed Horn's Reef at about 3.20 am and reached their protected waters shortly afterwards but not before the battleship OSTFRIESLAND was badly damaged by striking a mine. After searching for survivors, the British Fleet set course for home about noon and arrived at Scapa Flow during the forenoon of 2 June 1916.

**LIST OF SHIPS SUNK. FINAL SUMMARY.**

The German High Seas Fleet had in Scheer a resolute and resourceful Commander who extricated his ships from a situation facing disaster, following Hipper's initial successes with accurate shooting, aided by good quality shells and stable cordite charges. Scheer through desperation, but in audaciously executed evasive action and with good luck, succeeded, although his Fleet suffered grievious damage. Scheer's gain was then, in avoiding destruction.

The British Fleet was indeed fortunate in having a Commander of great strength of purpose and brilliance of assessment as Jellicoe, who, although restricted in taking more offensive action with such a huge and unwieldly Fleet and with limited information at his disposal of the enemy's movements, with great discipline kept his Fleet intact and directed his ships in true battle formation. Although he suffered initial painful losses, due to movements beyond his direction, his Fleet remained in control of the seas to the eventual victory to the Allies in the Great War of 1914- 1917.

Various possibilities relating to different tactics at Jutland have been debated over the years but the facts remain of the circumstances resulting at the time and are the only matters of realistic importance in Naval history, even though Jutland is described as a battle of missed opportunities to both sides.





INDEFATIGABLE going into action

**INDEFATIGABLE**
18,700 tons; 26 knots;
8 x 12 inch; 16 x 4 inch
2nd Battle squadron



INDEFATIGABLE sinking



QUEEN MARY

**QUEEN MARY**
26,350 tons; 28 knots,
8 x 13.5 inch; 16 x 4 inch
1st Battle Squadron




QUEEN MARY blows up

**INVINCIBLE**
17,500 tons; 28 knots;
8 x 12 inch; 16 x 4 inch.
Rear Admiral The Hon H L A Hood
3rd Battle Squadron





Destruction of INVINCIBLE



Wreck of INVINCIBLE in two parts

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## Battle of Jutland 31 May 1916

***List of Ships Sunk (As published by both British and German official publications)***

| | British | | German | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class of Ship | Name | Tonnage | Name | Tonnage |
| Battleships | | | Pommern | 13,200 |
| Battle-Cruisers | Indefatigable | 19,050 | Lutzow | 26,700 |
| | Invincable | 17,530 | | |
| | Queen Mary | 27,430 | | |
| Cruisers | Black Prince | 13,730 | | |
| | Defence | 14,800 | | |
| | Warrior | 13,750 | | |
| Light Cruisers | Tipperary | 1,900 | Wiesbaden | 5,600 |
| | | | Frauenlob | 2,700 |
| | | | Elbing | 4,400 |
| | | | Rostock | 4,900 |
| Destroyers | Ardent | 950 | S35 | 650 |
| | Fortune | 965 | V27 | 650 |
| | Nestor | 1,000 | V29 | 650 |
| | Nomad | 1,000 | V48 | 1,160 |
| | Shark | 950 | V44 | 570 |
| | Sparrowhawk | 950 | | |
| | Turbulent | 1,000 | | |
| | Totals: | 115,025 | | 61,180 |

# Opposing Fleets at the Battle of Jutland - 31 May 1916

## Organization of the British Fleet

### Battle Fleet

Iron Duke (Fleet Flagship) - Admiral Sir John Jellicoe

***Second Battle Squadron***

*1st Division*

King George - Vice Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram

Ajax, Centurion, Erin.

*2nd Division*

Orion - Rear Admiral A C Leveson

Monarch, Conqueror, Thunderer.

***Fourth Battle Squadron***

*3rd Division*

Iron Duke - Admiral Sir John Jellicoe

Royal Oak, Canada.

*4th Division*

Benbow - Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee

Bellerophon, Temeraire, Vanguard.

***First Battle Squadron***

*5th Division*

Colossus - Rear Admiral E F A Gaunt

Collingwood, Neptune, St Vincent.

*6th Division*

Marlborough - Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney

Revenge, Hercules,Agincourt.

*Attached Light Cruisers*

Boadicea, Bellona, Blanche, Active, Canterbury, Superb.

*Attached*

Oak (destroyer), Ariel (mine-layer).

### Battle-Cruisers

***Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron***

Invincible - Rear Admiral The Hon H L A Hood

Inflexible, Indomitable.

***Cruisers***

*First Cruiser Squadron*

Defence - Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot

Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh, Black Prince.

*Second Cruiser Squadron*

Minotaur - Rear Admiral H L Heath

Hampshire, Cochrane, Shannon.

*Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron*

Calliope - Commodore C E Le Mesurier

Constance, Caroline, Royalist, Comus.

***Destroyer Flotilla***

*Twelfth Flotilla*

Faulkner - Captain A J B Stirling

Marksman, Obedient, Maenad, Opal, Mary Rose, Marvel, Menace, Nessus, Narwhal, Mindful, Onslaught, Munster, Nonsuch, Noble.

*Eleventh Flotilla*

Castor (Light Cruiser) - Commodore J R P Hawksley

Kempenfelt, Ossory, Mystic, Moon, Morning Star, Magic, Mounsey, Mandate, Mischief, Marne, Minion, Michael, Mons, Martial, Milbrook.

*Fourth Flotilla*

Tipperary - Captain C J Wintour

Broke, Achates, Porpoise, Spitfire, Unity, Garland, Ambuscade, Ardent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk, Contest, Shark, Acasta, Ophelia, Christopher, Owl, Hardy, Midge.

### Battle-Cruiser Fleet

Lion (Fleet Flagship) - Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty

*First Battle-Cruiser Squadron*

Princess Royal - Rear Admiral O de B Brock

Queen Mary, Tiger.

*Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron*

New Zealand - Rear Admiral W C Pakenham

Indefatigable.

*Fifth Battle Squadron*

Barnham - Rear Admiral H Evan-Thomas

Valiant, Warspite, Malaya.

***Light Cruisers***

*First Light Cruiser Squadron*

Galatea - Commodore E S Alexander-Sinclair

Phaeton, Inconstant, Cordelia.

*Second Light Cruiser Squadron*

Southampton - Commodore W E E Goodenough

Birmingham, Nottingham, Dublin.

*Third Light Cruiser Squadron*

Falmouth - Rear Admiral T D W Napier

*Yarmouth, Birkenhead, Gloucester, Chester.*

***Destroyer Flotillas***

*First Flotilla*

Fearless (Light Cruiser) - Captain C D Roper

Acheron, Ariel, Attack, Hydra, Badger, Goshawk, Defender, Lizard, Lapwing.

*Thirteenth Flotilla*

Champion (Light Cruiser) - Captain J U Farie

Nestor, Nomad, Narborough, Obdurate, Petard, Pelican, Nerissa, Onslow, Moresby, Nicator.

*Ninth & Tenth Flotillas*

Lydiard - Commander M L Goldsmith

Liberty, Landrail, Laurel, Moorsom, Turbulent, Termagent.

Seaplane Carrier Engadine.

## Organisation of the German High Seas Fleet

**Battle Fleet**

***Battleships***

*5th Division*

König - Rear Admiral Benhcke

Grosser Kurfurst, Kronprinz, Markgraf.

*6th Division*

Kaiser - Rear Admiral Nordmann

Kaiserin, Prinzregent, Luitpold.

*1st Division*

Friedrich der Grosse (Fleet Flagship)
- Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer

Ostfriesland - Vice Admiral Schmidt

Thuringen, Helgoland, Oldenburg.

*2nd Division*

Posen - Rear Admiral Engelhardt

Rheinland, Nassau, Westfalen.

*3rd Division*

Deutschland - Rear Admiral Mauve

Hessen, Pommern.

*4th Division*

Hanover - Rear Admiral freiherr von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels

Schlesien, Holstein.

***Battle-Cruisers***

*First Scouting Group*

Lutzow - Vice Admiral Hipper

Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann.

***Light Cruisers***

*Second Scouting Group*

Frankfurt - Rear Admiral Boedicker

Wiesbaden, Pillau, Elbing.

*Fourth Scouting Group*

Stettin - Commodore von Reuter

Munchen, Hamburg, Frauenlob, Stuttgart.

***Destroyer Flotillas***

Rostock (Light Cruiser)
-Commodore Michelsen *First Leader of Torpedo Boats*

First Flotilla (1st Half) - Lieutenant Commander C Albrecht

Third Flotilla - Commander Hollmann

Fifth Flotilla - Commander Heinecke

Seventh Flotilla - Commander von Koch

Regensburg (Light Cruiser)
- Commodore Heinrich *Second Leader of Torpedo Boats*

Second Flotilla - Captain Schuur

Sixth Flotilla - Commander M Schultz

Ninth Flotilla - Commander Goehle



The flagships at Jutland





With ten 13.5-inch guns capable of launching a broadside of 14,000-pounds, the 25,000-ton dreadnought Iron Duke served as the Grand Fleet Flagship for Admiral John Jellicoe. She carried 12-inch armour, was 620 feet long and 89½ abeam, and could reach a speed of 21 knots.



Admiral Richard Scheer's High Seas Fleet Flagship, the 24,700-ton Friederich der Grosse, carried ten 12-inch guns that could fire an 8,500-pound broadside. Shorter (594-feet) and wider (95-feet) than Iron Duke, she traded a knot of speed for two inches more armour.




The battle-cruiser Moltke, which took a hammering from battle-cruisers of the British 5th Battle Squadron, but survived to become Admiral Scheer's flagship after Lützow had been crippled and sunk.



Prized for her top speed of 35 knots, the British Lydiard led a combined destroyer flotilla of 22 ships at Jutland. One of the new slender L-class vessels, she was 260-feet long and only 27-feet on the beam, and displaced 807 tons. She carried three 4-inch guns and four torpedoes.



Designed for 32.5 knots, the V-29 and her five sister ships in the Scichau class could get up to 36.5 knots at top speed. With approximately the same dimensions as her British destroyer counterparts, she carried only two 3.5-inch guns, but made up for it with eight torpedoes.



SMS Seydlitz, flagship of the German High seas Scouting Force after the Battle of Jutland

## Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe





Flagship Iron Duke Battleship
25,000 tons; 21 knots;
10 x 13.5 inch; 12 x 6 inch.

Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, commander of the British Grand Fleet, was hounded for years by critics who thought that Jutland should have resulted in the absolute destruction of the enemy. "A victory is judged not merely by material losses and damage, but by its results," he replied, observing that after the battle the German Fleet only once ventured outside its home waters.

## Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty





Flagship Lion Battlecruiser
26,500 tons; 28 knots;
8 x 15 inch; 16 x 4 inch.



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