- Author
- A.N. Other
- Subjects
- None noted
- Tags
-
- RAN Ships
- HMAS Adelaide II, HMAS Darwin, HMAS Success II
- Publication
- December 2013 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
By Sub-Lieutenant D. A. L. Thomason, RAN
Danielle Thomason was born in Sydney and raised at Lake Macquarie. She attended Avondale College and attained a Bachelor of Business – Marketing and Bachelor of Business – Arts. She has worked for a number of NSW public services including the Police Force and Health Support Services, as well as for the private company Acronis where she won the 2011 Asia Pacific Salesperson of the Year competition. Danielle joined the RAN in February 2013 and undertook New Entry Officers Course 48 with the honour of being guard commander at the graduation Ceremonial Sunset. She hopes to specialise in Mine Warfare and is looking forward to a long naval career.
If you use your strengths in business and you know what your competitors’ weaknesses are, then in the same way, we should in the Navy make sure the right people do the jobs they are strongest at.
Captain Martyn Bell[1]
Introduction
In direct response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the United Nations (UN) Security Council called for ‘immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait’.[2] Supporting the UN stance, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) contributed three warships to the multi-national fleet acting in the coalition Naval Task Group. The decision to make this contribution held various layers of importance for Australia at the time.
The strategic decision by the Australian government to send three ships to the Middle East Area of Operations is significant for a number of reasons. Primarily, it was the first Australian war-like operation since the Vietnam War which raised important political and foreign policy implications. The significance for the RAN however, was that, it was the first time RAN ships became involved in UN-authorised peacekeeping operations. Until that point all Australian peacekeeping efforts were largely conducted by Army and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) units.[3] When committing the three warships and their 600 RAN sailors to the Gulf Prime Minister Robert Hawke said:
We join with the rest of the world in saying that we will not tolerate, will not stand idly by, while any member of the international community purports to break the rules of civilised conduct in this way.[4]
This essay outlines the events that led to the war in the Arabian Gulf in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. It will explore Operation DAMASK and the RAN action against Iraq from 1990. It will examine the significance of the RAN involvement, the interoperability of RAN ship’s and task groups with foreign navies, the ability of warships to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously as well as the role played by naval forces across the spectrum of operations.
Reasoning Behind the Invasion
The decision made by Iraq to invade Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was primarily driven by economic reasons.[5] Kuwait had lent Iraq billions of dollars to fund their eight year war with Iran, however some ten years later Iraq was still struggling to repay the debt. Iraq considered the overproduction of crude oil by Kuwait to be the reason for their slow return to economic stability, as this led to a low crude oil price, which served only to inflame Iraq who claimed this to be hostile action.[6]
Wedged between Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Iraq, the Emirate of Kuwait is a land of huge oil reserves, with approximately ten to thirteen per cent of the world’s total reserves.[7] In 1990 it was an extremely wealthy state and was the largest exporter of oil in the Gulf. Kuwait was far less accomplished in military departments when compared with Iraq, who at the time had one of the largest armies in the world including an air force consisting of over 1,300 aircraft as well as a small missile equipped navy.[8]
Following a breakdown of diplomatic relations, the invasion commenced on 2 August 1990 and due to their sizable forces the Iraqis quickly nullified all resistance and announced the ‘incorporation’[9] of Kuwait into the state of Iraq. The invasion was confronted with a strong display of solidarity by the international community. Four days later, in direct response to the invasion, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. A blockade of Iraq’s access to the sea followed within weeks, as the United States of America (USA) assembled a large multinational task force in the Persian Gulf, while another was formed in Saudi Arabia. By the end of 1990 the coalition force numbered some 40,000 troops from thirty countries including Kuwait, the USA, United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, France, and Canada.[10]
In November 1990 the UN Security Council set 15 January 1991 as the deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq failed to comply. On 17 January full-scale war erupted when coalition forces began an air bombardment of Iraqi targets. Within four days, the coalition forces had destroyed the Iraqi invading forces and driven the remnants out of Kuwait, although the Iraqis retained significant military strength in Iraq. The air bombardment continued without respite until the war ended forty three days later.[11]
Ability of Warships to Conduct Multiple Tasks Simultaneously
From the start it was clear that the RAN was a fluid organisation and possessed a comprehensive ability for warships to carry out multiple tasks simultaneously.[12] On Thursday 9 August 1990 Rear Admiral Rod Taylor advised that Australia was to be involved in the Gulf crisis and the following day the OPORDER for Operation DAMASK was received. Just four days later two guided missile frigates commenced deployment to the Persian Gulf area with a support ship sailing the following day.[13] Captain Richard Menhinick, CSC, CDS, RAN, said:
One of the impressive aspects of Operation DAMASK was the fitting and sourcing of equipment for the ships involved, at very short notice. Indeed, for the DDG it was the fulfillment of the modernisation project, where equipment cut out of that project seemed to be installed in about six weeks.[14]
Technological additions augmented the offensive capabilities of the Australian warships, and provided further tactical defensive capabilities that were specifically designed to combat the operational situation that the RAN was steaming into.[15] Further additions to the warships included radar-absorbent material (RAM) panels, electro optical surveillance system (EOSS), Phalanxes, infra-red cooling systems on deck, as well as extra 20-calibre machine guns and ballistic protection. The joint operational tactical system (JOTS) was also fitted, as well as global command and control system-maritime (GCCS-M) in addition to satellite communications on all ships.
In a strong demonstration of versatility, professionalism and thoroughness of the planning staff, the warships conducted successful workups including the above mentioned crucial ship modifications, whilst in-transit to the Gulf.[16] The decision to deploy the ships and the early planning had been a good test of the ability of Head Quarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF)[17] and the department to anticipate the requirements of the government. Prime Minister Robert Hawke wrote later: I was impressed by the Australian Defence Force’s capacity to respond so quickly.[18]
Australia’s contribution to the Gulf was a Naval Task Group consisting of: two Oliver Hazard Class frigates HMA Ships Adelaide and Darwin, and the replenishment ship HMAS Success. Also a detachment from the Army’s 16th Air Defence Regiment, a RAN Clearance Diving Team, RAAF photo-interpreters, Defence Intelligence Organisation personnel and four medical teams.[19]
Role Played by Naval Forces Across Operations
The role of naval forces during the war in the Gulf was vast and arguably one of the most successful blockades in the history of modern warfare. As the intensity of the Gulf crisis deepened in late 1990 the RAN Task Group became more involved in military operations to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Operation DAMASK eventually resulted in Australian participation in the largest grouping of warships since the Second World War – possibly the most powerful and complex naval force ever assembled.[20]
The reinforcement of coalition forces during the conflict was immense. At the height of the conflict, the allied maritime forces in the area comprised of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, fifteen cruisers, sixty seven destroyers and frigates, and over one hundred logistics, amphibious and smaller craft.[21] These ships together deployed more than 800 fixed and rotary winged aircraft. In its entirety, the fleet was assembled from fifteen nations and participated in coordinated air and sea operations in an extreme and complex environment with a remarkably high degree of integration. Combined, the force’s firepower alone was prodigious, and although its main role was to establish sea and air control of the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea area, they also provided strike support for the allied effort ashore.[22]
The Iraq air force consisted of about 1300 aircraft in addition to a comprehensive array of anti-ship missiles as well as a small navy armed with missiles. The Iraqis were particularly clever in their use of mines, laying more than 1000 sea mines in the Arabian Gulf.[23] Mine warfare operations in the Gulf were particularly successful, and the versatility of the harbour clearance techniques employed accounted for 70% of all seabed area searches and harbour clearances by coalition divers.[24] These operations were conducted by several units from the US Navy and French diving and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams who were engaged alongside the RAN Clearance Diving Team 3 (CDT3).
The following figures outline the scope of operations involving the navy clearance diving and EOD units: four ports were opened, 2,157,200 square meters of seabed area was searched, 155km of jackstay laid, fifty one kilometres of jackstay laid for other nations’ use, sixty sea mines were dealt with, 234,986 pieces of ordinance were cleared, thirty demolition charges were rendered safe, thirty two wrecks were surveyed, seven ships were cleared and numerous buildings, ports and oil refinery facilities were cleared.[25]
Sanctions against Iraq were put in place in August 1990, and resulted in one of the most successful blockades in the history of modern warfare, forcing the Iraqis to suspend most of their maritime activities. With their ships confined to various harbours in the region, the crews were assigned to other duties. As a direct result, very little food and materials got through by sea.[26] In achieving this remarkable result the UN naval forces carried out the following operations from August to October 1990: 26,343 recorded challenges, 996 boardings and fifty one diversions.[27]
Interoperability of RAN Ships in Task Groups
Initially the ADF senior commanders had not expected that Australia would be involved militarily in the Gulf and whilst the decision by Australia’s Government to join the sanctions regime was relatively easy it did present a new challenge. While Britain already had a destroyer in the Gulf and would probably cooperate with the Americans, it was not clear if any other countries would join the multinational naval force, especially since it had not yet been authorised by the United Nations.[28]
While Adelaide, Darwin and Success were conducting workups on their way to the area of operations, simultaneously a Logistic Support Element was established at Muscat in Oman. This limited impression ashore was later reinforced by smaller detachments in Bahrain and Dubai and proved vital in arranging the delivery of stores and mail from Australia and in meeting the task groups’ demands for provisions and consumables.[29]
The three Australian ships continuously demonstrated the value of the USN relationship by quickly and easily integrating with what were essentially American-controlled activities. Cooperating closely with the ships of many other navies, the RAN units also provided Iraq with an unmistakable display of the multinational nature of the Coalition forces. Following the war’s end, Australia deployed a medical unit on Operation Habitat to northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort.[30]
The first meeting between leaders of the Multi-National Naval Force contingents was held on 9-10 September 1990 and the Australian Task Group was allocated for duty in the key ‘Alpha’ areas of the Gulf of Oman astride the shipping routes to the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf of Hormuz. They were to operate in loose association with the other naval groups engaged against Iraq.[31] At first the RAN was under orders only to identify, contact, interrogate and warn vessels. But after further United Nations resolutions were adopted the Australian Government gave its Navy authority to halt, board, search and if necessary to seize vessels and fire warning shots to enforce the United Nations sanctions.[32]
In an address to the Federal Parliament on 2 January 1992, President George W. Bush praised Australia’s contribution to the Gulf War and pointed out that the RAN and US Navy were the first two coalition partners in a joint boarding exercise to enforce the United Nations resolutions.[33] President Bush said:
In the Persian Gulf, we stood together against Saddam Hussein’s aggression. Indeed, the first two coalition partners in a joint boarding exercise to enforce the UN resolutions were Australians from DARWIN and Americans from USS BREWTON. During the war, the joint defence facilities here in Australia played an invaluable role in detecting launches of Iraqi Scud missiles. And today, two of the three navies represented in operations enforcing the embargo against Iraq are those of Australia and the US.[34]
Conclusion
This essay has outlined the events that led to the war in the Arabian Gulf, explored the RAN participation in and conduction of Operation DAMASK and highlighted the significant capability of the RAN to operate in task groups and with foreign navies. It has discussed the ability of Australian warships to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously and the role played by naval forces across the spectrum of operations.
By any measure of effectiveness, the maritime operations conducted involving the RAN in the 1990-91 Gulf War were highly successful.[35] From a military perspective the objectives set down by UN sanctions were achieved with a comparatively small loss of life among the coalition forces. As discussed in this essay, for the RAN in particular, the war provided the most significant test of sea readiness and capability since the Vietnam War. It has highlighted the strengths of the RAN through the multi layered levels of operations and its capacity to achieve the mission; to fight and win at sea.
From 1990 until 2009 the RAN operated almost continually in the Middle East region. This commitment, involving a wide range of tasks, became one of the longest and most complex ongoing operations ever undertaken by the ADF. At the time of writing it had involved two conventional wars (three if counting the ‘war’ on terrorism), a wide variety of threats, thousands of personnel and a large portion of the Navy’s major fleet units. Despite the scale and importance of the operations conducted, recognition of this extended campaign has received relatively scant media coverage and even less academic analysis.[36]
Bibliography
Australian War Memorial 2013, The First Gulf War, 1990-91, Australian War Memorial, accessed 19 April 2013, <http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/gulf/>.
Faircount Media in conjunction with Sea Power Centre – Australia. 2011, 100 Years of the Royal Australian Navy, Faircount Media, Sydney
Hawke, Robert. 1994, The Hawke Memoirs, William Heinemann, Melbourne
Horner, David. 2011, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Volume 2, Australia and the New World Order: From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: 1988-1991, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne
Mortimer, John and Stevens, David. 2009, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, Presence, Power Projection and Sea Control: The RAN in the Gulf 1990-2009, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra
Odgers, George. 1993, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, National Book Distributors, Sydney
Stevens, David (ed). 2001, The Royal Australian Navy: A History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne
Notes
[1] Captain Martyn Bell 2009, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, Presence, Power Projection and Sea Control: The RAN in the Gulf 1990-2009, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra, 190.
[2] Odgers, George. 1993, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, National Book Distributors, Sydney, 188.
[3] Horner, David. 2011, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Volume 2, Australia and the New World Order: From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: 1988-1991, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 293.
[4] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 188.
[5] Horner, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Vol 2, 271.
[6] Horner, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Vol 2, 272.
[7] Horner, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian ans Post-Cold War Operations Vol 2, 276.
[8] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 188.
[9] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 188.
[10] Mortimer, John and Stevens, David. 2009, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, Presence, Power Projection and Sea Control: The RAN in the Gulf 1990-2009, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra, 21.
[11] Horner, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Vol 2, 288.
[12] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, National Book Distributors, Sydney, 188.
[13] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 21.
[14] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 87.
[15] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 97.
[16] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 97.
[17] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 263.
[18] Hawke, Robert. 1994, The Hawke Memoirs, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 512.
[19] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 3.
[20] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 49.
[21] Horner, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Vol 2 ,337.
[22] Horner, Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations Vol 2, 288.
[23] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 188.
[24] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 200.
[25] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 141.
[26] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 193.
[27] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 193.
[28] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 188.
[29] Stevens, David (ed). 2001, The Royal Australian Navy: A History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 262.
[30] Australian War Memorial 2013, The First Gulf War, 1990-91, Australian War Memorial, accessed 19 April 2013, <http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/gulf/>.
[31] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 191.
[32] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 191.
[33] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 192.
[34] Odgers, Australian Defence Force Series, Navy Australia, 192.
[35] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 22.
[36] Mortimer and Stevens, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 28, 2.