- Author
- A.N. Other
- Subjects
- Naval Engagements, Operations and Capabilities
- Tags
- None noted.
- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- June 2023 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
By MIDN C.A.F. Cumberlidge RAN
MIDN Christopher Cumberlidge hails from the Sunshine Coast and already has a nursing degree. However, he is changing stream as he has a keen interest in asymmetric warfare, which is the topic of his essay. He is also aiming to become a Clearance Diver, but sees potential for that to be a base for developing further the RAN’s capacity to undertake a wider range of asymmetric warfare in the maritime environment. His first posting after Creswell will be to HMAS Stirling.
Introduction
Naval conflict in a modern context can consist of both conventional and irregular warfare. For much of Australia’s naval history, a dedicated unit with the capability to infiltrate deep behind enemy lines and perform raiding, sabotage, and special reconnaissance did not exist.
Following the fall of Singapore, Captain Ivan Lyon of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) presented the idea to raise a guerrilla force capable of striking Japanese occupied harbours (Mortimer, 2022). This force, made up of volunteers from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and AIB, was given the administrative designation Z Special.
Aim
This paper seeks to evaluate the theory of irregular warfare and its relevance to the modern maritime battlespace. It will highlight lessons learned, as well as review the impacts of technological advancement in its application.
Operation Jaywick: An audacious strike
Operation Jaywick was one of the first applications of these unconventional tactics in a maritime setting by the RAN. On 02 Sep 1943 Z Special commandos departed Australia aboard a Japanese fishing trawler called the Krait (Smith, 2018). After arriving at their staging ground, six members of Z Special infiltrated Singapore harbour utilising folboats and planted time-delayed explosives beneath target Japanese ships (Mortimer, 2022). Four ships were destroyed or critically damaged by this action. Under the cover of darkness the operators exfiltrated without detection and arrived safely back in Australia a few weeks later. The success of this operation represented the first strike back after an embarrassing defeat at the fall of Singapore.
Z Special Unit defied conventional wisdom by applying unconventional tactics and strategies to complete their mission, achieving with six highly trained individuals what may otherwise have required an entire naval task force (Spulak, 2007). The Japanese believed that Singapore harbour was too geographically isolated from Allied forces to be under threat, Z Special utilised surprise to exploit this weakness (Djokovic, 2022). They achieved relative superiority through the application of irregular warfare principles, against a technologically superior and asset dependent adversary.
Lessons for the RAN
Many similarities can be drawn between Australia during WWII and modern times. China has replaced Japan as our strategic competitor in the region and the United States maintains a hegemony that was once enjoyed by Britain (Lake and Morgan, 2010). The fall of Singapore in Feb 1942 proved to the Australian Government that Britain was unable to guarantee protection through their military. In times of conflict the homeland often takes priority over its allies. The United States cannot guarantee protection for Australia, and as a result Australia must have the organic capability to defend itself (White, 2022).
As China claims domination over the military technology field and is far numerically superior, Australia needs to find alternative and technology-reduced strategies to combat this threat. Without the ability to secure Air, Ground, or Sea superiority, Australia must explore military strategies previously and effectively utilised by Z Special against a superior military power (Brown, 2022). It is therefore essential Australia cultivates and maintains maritime special operations capabilities to independently fight our adversaries.
Operation Jaywick was a highly successful application of irregular warfare concepts by the Australian Military. The reasons for its success was not only the destruction of vital Japanese assets, but the psychological damage and paranoia achieved by clandestine raiding (Smith, 2018). Operation Jaywick challenged Japanese notions of supremacy and their certainty in resisting Allied attack (Brown, 2022). In this way irregular warfare leaves ambiguity for the enemy in assessing the reach and limits of our capability. Japanese forces were unaware of the raid’s perpetrators, and as a result dedicated vast resources for the remainder of the conflict in the protection of their assets (Mortimer, 2022). These resources may have otherwise been used to further the war effort against Australia. This is especially relevant to the modern RAN as our adversaries have a significant advantage in material assets.
Operation Jaywick was developed in secrecy, not only from the Japanese, but also from Allied officers who did not believe in the fast-paced high-risk application of clandestine warfare (Mortimer, 2022). The success of Operation Jaywick proved that this mindset was wrong. In a modern context, key RAN doctrine does not articulate if or how irregular warfare may be applied (RAN, 2022). In the Future Maritime Operating Concept 2025 (FMOC), some analysis of asymmetric warfare is made but little description is offered for how this may manifest for Australia or its enemies. As has been demonstrated in the past, asymmetry will likely play a part in future warfighting. The RAN has a duty to ensure that this capability is practised and actively maintained. If the RAN does not choose to pursue irregular warfare capability through the maintenance of special operations personnel, they must actively play a role in enabling it, potentially through the use of grey zone ships or supporting the 2nd Commando Regiment and Special Air Service Regiment elements (Lohaus, 2016).
Technological advancements
Historically new technologies have radically changed the method in which warfare is conducted (Burmaoglu and Saritas, 2017). Through its alliances with Britain and the United States, Australia has managed to stay at the forefront of new technological trends. As with all change however, acquiring, adopting and integrating new technologies is a great challenge the RAN must face. Some of the most radical elements of modern conflict is the adoption of new domains of warfare. The maritime battlespace has seen an expansion of domains to include space, information, and electromagnetic, as well as increased augmentation of sub-surface and seabed domains (RAN, 2022). Due to the enveloping opacity of these domains, clandestine and asymmetric operations will disproportionately occupy these fronts (Wortzel, 2017). Perhaps the largest and most conspicuous technological adoption by the RAN is the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN). The program has come at immense financial and political cost, and is estimated to take in excess of twenty years to adopt and implement (Hellyer and Nicholls, 2022). While there are costs involved in this program, it is a direction the RAN must take to stay relevant in the modern battlespace. Like Z Special Unit, a submarine has the capability to strike unseen against the enemy, draw resources from the adversary to find and combat them, and perform vital ISR to enable and support conventional RAN forces (Jennings and Goldrick, 2022). While individuals cannot replace the capability of an SSN, utilising submarines as a means of projection for diver and special forces elements combines varying principles of irregular warfare, and can be exploited to achieve relative superiority (Hughes, 2018). The amalgamation and cross functional employment of these elements serve as key force multipliers for existing RAN assets, and are capable of directly influencing the tactical and strategic calculations of our adversaries in the region (Hughes, 2018). While the introduction of submarine technologies has comprehensively changed the battlespace, the financial and manpower barriers for these assets cannot be overlooked (Hellyer, 2020). To uphold the Defence Force’s duty of protecting Australia, the RAN must therefore look to irregular warfare elements utilising existing technologies, including diver propulsion vehicles, manned submersible vehicles, and diving rebreathers to achieve strategic and tactical goals (National Defense, 2022). Whether it be preparation of the environment oriented towards amphibious force mobility requirements, special reconnaissance, or precision strikes as a means of enabling current conventional RAN units, by applying our assets in this way Australia can gain an array of strategic leverage against our adversaries, and hopeful deterrence against the outbreak of conflict (Jaishankar, 2020). So as to effectively fight conflicts against our militarily superior adversaries, RAN doctrine must take into consideration the lessons learned from Operation Jaywick. RAN doctrine fails to reflect these concepts or utilise standard principles of irregular warfare (McRaven, 1993). Fighting our adversaries asymmetrically negates their technological advantage and can therefore achieve relative superiority (McRaven, 1993). Neglecting to interoperate with irregular warfare elements is a myopic exclusion of these core capabilities. Failure to consider these warfare tenets could mean catastrophic ill preparedness for any future conflict, avoidable loss of Australian assets and lives and a failure to achieve the ADF’s role in defending Australia and its interests (McRaven, 1993).
Conclusion
Australia is undergoing its most fundamental strategic realignment since WWII. Focus has shifted toward threats closer to home independent of allied support (Lake and Morgan, 2010). Whilst Australia cannot match the military supremacy of the United States, the ADF can contribute niche capabilities to counter our adversaries using covert military forces and a style of fighting akin to insurgency (Langford, 2014). While Operation Jaywick is not the absolute basis for irregular warfare, it is sufficient to demonstrate the validity of irregular warfare principles and show the importance of the relationship between unconventional forces and the modern battlespace. According to the doctrines of conventional warfare these numerically inferior forces should fail to achieve victory and yet they do. The personnel of Operation Jaywick demonstrate that a simple plan conducted in secret, and executed with speed, surprise, and violence of action is a devastatingly effective tool.
Recommendations
The RAN should renew its focus on irregular warfare and plan a significant investment in this capability. By analysing the efficacy of asymmetric warfare in a maritime setting compared with the large footprint of fleet engagement, both can achieve similar outcomes if utilised correctly (McRaven, 1993). Australia must have the ability to utilise limited technology, assets, and supplies to cause an overwhelming loss of capability to an asset dependent and technology reliant adversary. Through the current plan of Pelorus 2022 (RAN, 2022) the RAN fails to acquire the necessary assets in a time sensitive manner. RAN leadership must appreciate that a viable component to use as a force multiplier already exists, and it can synergise with existing assets in a way that assures strategic and tactical advantage.
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