- Author
- Plater, Robert, Midshipman, RAN
- Subjects
- Biographies and personal histories
- Tags
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- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- September 2007 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
On appointment in 1943 as Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, Fraser commanded the Russian convoys against the highly capable German fleet. Recognising excellence he appointed Captain Michael Denny to his staff, a leader in ‘surface radar detection to the tactics of war at sea’. The now famous ‘ULTRA’ decrypts gave insight into Scharnhorst’s intentions and Fraser was convinced she would soon enter action. Always ready for sea he raised his Flag on the Duke of York and commenced escort duty.
While in Russia, Fraser showed his gentlemanly nature. Having been imprisoned by the Bolsheviks during the red revolution, he could have been forgiven for holding a grudge. Instead he proved quite the diplomat winning over his guarded Russian host while taking care of his sailors’ morale with improved mail delivery. He left Russia to join the next convoy from Britain to Russia, codenamed JW.55B.
The fleet had a busy time sailing to Iceland to refuel before joining Convoy JW.55B. Intelligence gathered from ‘ULTRA’ stated that Scharnhorst was being readied for sea, whilst simultaneously, a convoy was sailing from Russia to Britain, RA.55A, escorted by Vice-Admiral ‘Bob’ Burnett’s 10th Cruiser Squadron. Fraser’s plan was for the two convoys, escorted by Burnett (Force One) and Fraser (Force Two), to rendezvous at Bear Island. However, Force Two had been delayed. Fraser, risking detection, broke radio silence and ordered JW.55B to reverse course for three hours and his own ‘Force Two’ to increase speed. In reality JW.55B reduced speed in the rough Arctic; the result fitted the intention of the order. And demonstrated the flexibility Fraser allowed his subordinates.
Early on the morning of 26th December, Fraser again broke radio silence to take charge of the ensuing battle and ordered JW.55B to turn north, away from North Cape, and for JW.55B, Force One and Force Two to signal their position, course and speed. Meanwhile Scharnhorst had been steadily moving away from her destroyer escorts, not only in pursuit of JW.55B, but also between the closing British forces.
The superior British radar identified Scharnhorst and at 0924, HMS Belfast, part of Force One, opened fire with star shells and HMS Norfolk fired and hit Scharnhorst’s forward radar. Scharnhorst, under orders to strike the convoy, used her superior speed in the rough conditions to break off the action. The Battle of North Cape had begun.
At around noon, with Fraser knowing the limited endurance of his destroyers and considering withdrawal, Norfolk and Belfast reported a radar contact. Twenty minutes later Sheffield reported sighting the enemy and Force One was ordered to open fire at 11,000 yards. During this time Scharnhorst, now heading home, was, due to the damaged radar, being unknowingly corralled towards Force One.
At 1617 Duke of York made radar contact at 45,500 yards, a range not available with German technology, and signalled this report as well as the Duke of York’s position. Forty minutes later, Force One made radar contact with Force Two and each illuminated Scharnhorst with star shells: ‘Scharnhorst turrets were trained fore and aft. She seemed completely unaware that there was anything to the south of her.’ Duke of York opened fire and hit the enemy. The British destroyers were in position to fire torpedoes, but awaited Fraser’s order. The trap had been sprung.
Over the next four hours Scharnhorst was hit by gunfire from both Force One and Force Two causing serious damage to her weapons and engines, and was forced to reduce speed. Scharnhorst was now unable to break away from the attack but continued to return fire, but without radar this proved ineffective. Fraser then ordered torpedo attacks crippling the Scharnhorst. At 1945, Scharnhorst sank by the bows; thirty-six survivors were recovered.
Fittingly for Fraser, the Battle of North Cape was the last battleship-to-battleship engagement of the war. Although the plan was simple in design, its execution required: high levels of trust between the allied elements, the ability to plan with long distances and time in mind, and the confidence to do what is necessary, such as breaking radio silence, when required. This battle also signalled the end of major engagements for the Home Fleet, allowing the transfer of vessels to reinforce the Eastern Fleet.
In August 1944, Fraser was made Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and tasked with establishing the British Pacific Fleet as a self-sufficient force able to fight for the final defeat of Japan. Due to the amphibious nature of the Pacific theatre, this fleet would be built around modern carriers with the major problem being long distance supply.