- Author
- Waring, P.S., Midshipman, RAN
- Subjects
- Biographies and personal histories
- Tags
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- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- September 2008 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
The favourite grandson of Queen Victoria, Kaiser Wilhelm II grew up in the shadow of the Royal Navy’s grandeur. Mahan’s work is said to have enthralled the Kaiser and did much to reinforce his naval and extra-continental fantasies. The German leader was intent upon transforming his nation into a global power and Mahan’s work provided him and his Admirals, including the very capable Tirpitz, with the rationale and model for achieving that end. The German naval build up, although predominantly designed to deter rather than engage the British fleet,* prompted the Royal Navy to restructure and in typically Mahanian fashion concentrate the fleet in northern waters. By 1900 the German Navy had appropriated the funds required to double their forces and in February 1906 the Dreadnought, Jackie Fisher’s famed ‘all big gun battleship’, was slipped marking a turning point from which the respective navies and tensions grew rapidly. This suspicion did much to facilitate the system of alliances which dominated European politics leading up to the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914.
Imperial Apologist or Inspirational Intellectual
It is important to remember the inherent difficulty of attempting to establish any clear links between theory and practice. It may be that Mahan’s work merely reinforced the general predisposition of government decision makers. The fact that America went on to enjoy great success and power during the twentieth century may tint the lens through which we perceive his work and the influence it had. US naval predominance did much to facilitate the global hegemony America enjoys today, a fact which may exaggerate the significance of the pre-eminent nineteenth century activist for US naval growth. In the case of Germany, the nautical fetishes of the Kaiser were probably reinforced rather than generated by Mahan’s work. However, the closeness of Mahan to figures such as Roosevelt, the originality of his work, the obvious similarities between German naval policy and Mahan’s prescriptions and the strong debate still raging over his strategic analysis make it difficult to discount his academic leadership. To say that Mahan’s work reinforced rather than guided policy; that it only provided a veneer of academic justification to entrenched predispositions does not detract from what he wrote. Although it does call into question the applicability of the word leadership. In the end though it was not just the influence Mahan had on his contemporaries that counts most but his lucid and comprehensive demonstration of the usefulness of history to the naval officer. Nobody before or since has provided a better rationale for the study of history by those in the naval profession and without his trailblazing scholarship the humanities may still be ignored by naval intellectuals.
Conclusion
Was Mahan a leader? Did he provide leadership through scholarship or merely an academic rationale for the imperialist predispositions of those who sought glory for both themselves and their nations? The difficulties involved in forming any solid conclusions are not easily overcome, especially in an essay as limited in size as this one. However, what is less contentious is the quite obvious influence Mahan’s writing had on the policy of the three greatest naval powers of his era. He may not have guided policy but he certainly influenced it through the application of sound and well reasoned scholarship. Perhaps Mahan’s work did justify imperialism but it did so in a rational, unemotional manner, tying a rational conception of the national interest to the acquisition of an empire.
In the final analysis, especially when examined from the perspective of a young naval officer, Mahan’s greatest legacy (or curse when considered by the historically uninspired midshipman) was his demonstration of the utility of history as a subject of study for all naval officers.
* Risikogedankeor or ‘Risk Theory’ developed by Tirpitz was based on the belief that the Royal Navy would concede some of its dominant command of the sea if the German Navy could threaten it sufficiently for the British to believe that any Anglo-German confrontation would undermine its ability to confront other rivals.