- Author
- Thomas, Mitchell, Midshipman, RAN
- Subjects
- Biographies and personal histories, WWII operations, History - WW2
- Tags
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- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- December 2006 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
However, this near-perfect record came to an end at the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Here he saw the devastating loss of four fleet carriers at the conclusion of the battle. As a result, he was dishonoured and demoted to various other unimportant commands including the defence of the island of Saipan in 1944.
On 6th July 1944, during the last stages of the Allied conquest of the island of Saipan, Nagumo committed suicide for his failure to hold the island. ((The Times Atlas of the Second World War, 1989, London, Times Books Limited))
Leadership and Superior/Subordinate Relationships
Like many other senior Japanese naval officers, Nagumo was initially opposed to the ‘incorrigible gambler’ ((Van der Vat, D, 2001, Pearl Harbour, Toronto, Madison Press Books, p 19.)) Yamamoto’s daring plan to attack the American battleship fleet at Pearl Harbour. However, when Yamamoto pushed through his attack plans by threatening to resign, Nagumo, along with the other members of the Japanese naval command, loyally accepted their orders and attempted to execute them to the best of their ability. The military historian, Prague, argued that: ‘No little credit belongs to Nagumo…who had strenuously objected to Yamamoto’s foolhardy venture. To make the adjustment from strong opposition to successful execution required a high order of flexibility and loyalty. These are the attributes of a strong leader that Nagumo demonstrated.’ ((Prague, D, 1986, Pearl Harbour. The Verdict of History. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, p 495.))
Nagumo had always retained reservations about Yamamoto’s audacious attack plans. Once it was reported that his attack force had immobilised the American Pacific battleship force, while suffering minimal losses, he was unwilling to risk potential attack by American carrier- and land-based aircraft, especially after war games had estimated that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour would cost them two carriers lost and another two damaged. ((Wilmott, H, Haruo, T & Johnson, W, 2001, Pearl Harbour. London, Cassell & Co.)) This, along with the fact that Yamamoto’s attack plan did not give serious consideration to the base facilities at Pearl Harbour as a proper target for offensive operations, became more than enough reason for Nagumo to withdraw his force.
Nagumo declined to take risks that a more aggressive commander might have been wiling to take. A keener supporter of battleships, rather than aircraft carriers, as the supreme instrument of decision at sea, Nagumo was content only to have destroyed the enemy’s battleship force. ((Macksey, K, 1987, Military Errors of World War Two, London, Cassell & Co.)) So far, he had succeeded in an operation he had never liked, and his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Ryunosake Kusaka, quite agreed. Like Nagumo, Kusaka had never liked the Pearl Harbour attack plan from the outset. Now, Kusaka, too, could see all sorts of reasons why the attack should be broken off and the attack force headed home to Japan. ((Hoyt, E, 1986, Japan’s War, The Great Pacific Conflict, New York, McGraw-Hill)) Both Nagumo and Kusaka were astounded and elated at having kept their forces intact; they were in no mood for further gambles. They reasoned that the attack had more than achieved its hoped-for results and that a second assault would be far riskier. ((Spector, R, 1985, Eagles Against the Sun. New York, Vintage Books, p 84.))
Admiral Nagumo’s decision to withdraw his fleet was also influenced by a number of other important factors that many other critics have failed to take into consideration, including deteriorating weather conditions, the withdrawal of his slow and vulnerable fleet tankers, a shortage of heavy bombs, significantly more losses to his second wave for little additional damage, and lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of the American fleet carriers.
After the war, in his book I Led the Air Attack on Pearl Harbour, Commander Mitsuo Fuchida wrote that the returning flyers favoured pressing the attack, principally to force the American carriers into combat. Reporting the results of the two air attacks to Admiral Nagumo, he wrote ‘There are still many targets remaining that should be attacked. Therefore I recommend that another attack be launched. ((Renzi, W & Roehrs, M, Never Look Back. A History of World War Two in the Pacific, 1991, New York, M E Sharp Inc., p 43.)) However, Admiral Nagumo, pleased with the success of his attacks on the American battleships, was said to have observed. ‘We may then conclude that the anticipated results have been achieved’ ((Stillwell, P (ed), Air Raid: Pearl Harbour! Recollections of a Day of Infamy, 1981, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, p 16)) so he continued with the original plan to withdraw his fleet.