- Author
- Collins, Vice Admiral Sir John
- Subjects
- WWII operations
- Tags
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- RAN Ships
- HMAS Arunta I, HMAS Manoora I, HMAS Kanimbla I, HMAS Westralia I, HMAS Warramunga I, HMAS Shropshire, HMAS Gascoyne I, HMAS Australia II
- Publication
- January 1972 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
Next morning, Trafalgar Day 21st October, dawned clear and warm with Australia, Shropshire and destroyers helping to provide covering fire as required by the troops ashore. Suddenly an enemy low flying plane appeared and selected Australia as its target. Although the aircraft was hit by gunfire and well on fire, it came on. It was the first of the kamikazes (suicide planes) and the pilot crashed it onto the bridge with disastrous results for all those in exposed positions. Practically all the bridge personnel were killed including Captain Dechaineux and 29 others. Sixty four officers and men were wounded, many seriously, including the author. Australia joined the other cripple, Honolulu, and escorted by Warramunga and an American destroyer, returned for repairs. This left Shropshire and Arunta to show the Australian flag at the battle proper.
The Command organisation which had control of this very complicated series of actions was unusual, as there were two Fleet Commanders. The 7th Fleet under Kinkaid had the responsibility for Gulf and the landing. The Bombardment and Fire Support Groups of the 7th Fleet, led by Admiral Oldendorf, were in the Gulf. They consisted of six battleships, nine cruisers, including Shropshire, and several destroyer squadrons with Arunta amongst them. In addition there was the usual paraphernalia of a large combined operation landing craft, transports, supply and store ships and such like. Outside to seaward were the sixteen escort carriers, detached from the 3rd Fleet and operating with the 7th for close support of the landings under Rear Admiral Sprague.
Farther to the northward and seaward in a position to cover the whole operation was the mighty 3rd Fleet which, despite one group being detached for fuelling, comprised no less than six battleships, ten assault carriers, eight cruisers and forty one destroyers. This Fleet was operating under Admiral Halsey and was not a part of Kinkaid’s 7th Fleet command.
The Japanese High Command had invented a complicated plan, SHO, to counter an attack on the Philippines: a two pronged attack on Leyte Gulf through the San Bernadino and Surigao Straits by the main surface forces, while the Japanese Aircraft Carrier Force, operating to the northward, decoyed the 3rd Fleet with its aircraft away from its position covering the Gulf.
The first news came to Admiral Kinkaid early in the morning of 23rd October when a signal was received from Admiral Christie at Perth, Western Australia, relaying an enemy report from US Submarine Darter of a large force of heavy ships with destroyers. Darter and Dace were patrolling the southern end of the Palawan Passage and had sighted Kurita’s Centre Force proceeding in accordance with SHO 1. This was the main fleet and consisted of five battleships including the great Yamato and Musashi, the most powerful battleships ever built, of 68,000 tons with 9 18 inch guns, together with twelve cruisers and fourteen destroyers, but no aircraft carriers.
Strangely enough, Kurita had no anti-submarine screen ahead of his force, so Darter and Dace, after reporting, were able to make a good attack. Kurita’s flagship (the cruiser Atago) and the cruiser Maya were sunk. Another cruiser was heavily damaged and returned to Singapore with a destroyer escort. It was a bad start for Kurita who swam to a destroyer and eventually hoisted his flag in the battleship Yamato. Kinkaid and Halsey at last had some real news.
It is remarkable how many times submarines make the first sighting despite their restricted vision. The first report received by the Japanese Command of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941 was from a submarine, as was the first reports to the US Command of the main Japanese forces in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944.
No further information was received on 23rd but on the morning of the 24th, air searches were effective. The Centre Force was located at the southern of Mindanao. Halsey immediately ordered an air strike and recalled McCain’s Carrier Group that had been detached to fuel.
As the strike was being executed, Japanese naval planes were operating from Luzon on the first real opposition to the Leyte landings. They concentrated on Admiral Sherman’s Group 3 of Halsey’s Fleet and, although they suffered heavy aircraft losses, obtained a direct hit on the carrier USS Princeton. This ship had to be sunk despite heroic efforts to get the fire under control.
However, the air strike against Kurita’s Centre Force got away and reached the target at 10.30 a.m. Strikes continued across the Sibuyan Sea. Like Admiral Phillips in Prince of Wales, Kurita had no carriers with him and so had no fighter protection. Again, like Phillips, he was let down by the shore based air which, despite calls for help, provided no fighter protection for his Fleet. At 3 p.m. Kurita found the going too hot and reversed his course to the westward.
One can hardly blame him; without fighter cover, he had suffered heavy losses. The great Musashi was sunk. She had never fired a shot at an enemy ship. Yamato, her sister ship, received two bomb hits as did two other battleships. A heavy cruiser was forced to retire damaged. However, an hour before sunset, Kurita again turned eastward and headed towards Surigao Strait. This movement was observed from the air and reported to Halsey. We will leave the Centre Force for the moment, delayed and damaged but steaming towards Leyte Gulf.