Roger Buxton, an active member of the Society’s Victorian Chapter has obtained two original, typed reports of the 1945 recovery of German Bieber and Seehund class midget submarines by Lieutenant V J Steele RNVR. These were provided by his son who served in the Royal Canadian Navy. The originals and photographs are now in the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Victorian library. The following is a condensed version of the Bieber recovery at Dover in 1945.
From Lieutenant J. V. Steele R.N.V.R, D.T.M.(I).
Date 20th January, 1945.
Recovery of German Midget Submarine and Torpedo. Dover. January, 1945
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report of the recovery of a German Midget submarine of the “Bieber” class complete with one torpedo, at Dover on the night of Monday, 8th January, 1945.
At 2350 on Friday 29 December 1944, whilst on leave at my home in Tadworth Surrey, I received a telephone call from the D.T.M. Duty Officer stating that a car would pick me up at 0500 as I was required for immediate special duty. This car arrived at 0230 and I reported for duty at 0415, when I was informed that a German Midget Submarine was in tow in the Channel and was en route for Dover. This submarine was believed to be of the Bieber class, and might be armed with one or two torpedoes or a torpedo and a mine, probably the latter. The Admiralty required all specimens intact.
Having collected tools and gear, I left the Admiralty by road for Dover at 0445, reporting to the Duty Commander, Dover Castle at 0635. The Duty Commander told me that this submarine had been captured off the River Scheldte by H.M.S. READY, and had been towed to the Downs where tow was passed to H.M.T. BRASSEY. Owing to thick fog H.M.T. BRASSEY was still at anchor in the Downs with little prospect of early arrival in Dover. He then made a signal to BRASSEY requesting notice of BRASSEY’s intentions and I retired to the naval mess for breakfast. I never saw the reply to this latter signal – if any was ever made – for at 0845 I received an urgent call to say that BRASSEY, complete with tow, was approaching Dover. Also that Chief of Staff’s orders were to take over the tow from BRASSEY outside the harbour – to a launch provided – and to beach the submarine near the western end of the harbour, close to windward of the hulk of the destroyer CODRINGTON [ HMS CODRINGTON had been bombed and beached in Dover Harbour in 1940. Ed.]. I was given to understand that these orders had been passed to BRASSEY also.
I drove with all speed to the Penns, boarded a waiting launch and proceeded out of the harbour, just in time to meet the BRASSEY. I hove close to, and hailed the two officers I could see on BRASSEY’s bridge, saying that I was ready to take over the tow, my idea being to take over the tow without heaving to. However, the reply which I presumed to come from the CO of the BRASSEY informed me that he did not intend to pass the tow, but to bring the submarine right into the harbour, and furthermore that he did not intend to beach the tow. I subsequently found that the officer making this reply was not the CO but the Salvage Officer, Dover Command, Lt. Commander McFee R.N.R. He also asked that I should get him the assistance of a motor boat as quickly as possible. There being neither the time nor the circumstances to point out my orders from the Chief of Staff on the method of salvage, I returned to the penns at full speed, borrowed a motor launch from the King’s Harbour Master, and left the penns once more.
By this time BRASSEY had entered the harbour by the eastern entrance, and having done so was apparently undecided as to the next move, and accordingly was turning 360 degrees to starboard and had reduced speed. As this turn completed the tow passed within about 100 feet of my launch, and I then saw that quite clearly the submarine was sinking and sinking quickly. Outside the harbour all the foredeck and conning tower had been visible, but now only the forepeak and the top of the conning tower were in sight. By this time I was nearly alongside BRASSEY, and seeing the tow disappearing under slack tow rope. I hailed him and advised him to get under way again and to make for the beach. Unfortunately, he had decided on another course, and down went the anchor. Appreciating that the submarine was rapidly following the anchor, he weighed again and got under way, but too late, for just as the tow rope took the strain, the submarine sank by the stern and disappeared. This was at 0925 on Saturday, 30th December.
At this stage a breakdown in communications took place between the Salvage Officer in the stern of the BRASSEY and her CO on the bridge, as a result of which the latter never received the order to stop, and so once again the rope took the strain and appeared to me to tow. However, I quickly reboarded my launch, and estimating the position I had last seen the submarine, I dropped the small marker pellet carried by the launch. About two minutes later, as might well have been expected, the tow rope – a grass line – parted, and the submarine was now gone without trace. BRASSEY stopped immediately, but as she carried no dan buoys or marker buoys of any sort, it was some minutes before one could be borrowed from another launch, and dropped in the estimated position of the tow. This position was about 200 yards westward of the first pellet. I re-boarded BRASSEY, and having signalled Admiral Commanding Dover of the situation and the estimated position of the submarine, I discussed the next step with Lt. Cdr. McFee who suggested that his diver should go down by the No 2 marker pellet and see if he could find the submarine. This appeared to be the obvious step, but in view of the fact that the submarine was suspected of carrying a magnetic mine, I decided that diving by a civilian diver in deep water diving dress was not to be encouraged, so I suggested a temporary suspension of operations whilst I might contact D.T.M.(I) on the subject.
I was just about to leave for the penns when the S.O.(I) Dover, Commander Lambert R.N.V.R and the R.M.S.O., Dover, Lieut. Parker R.N.V.R. both arrived, and both agreed with me that a civilian diver was undesirable. We then returned to the penns, and driving up to the Castle, put the whole situation before the Chief of Staff. He agreed, and contacted D.T.M., and in due course arrangements made for a VERNON diving party to proceed forthwith to Dover. Lieut. Nickson, R.N.V.R., of Enemy Mining Section, HMS VERNON, was also instructed to proceed to Dover to assist and advise in the disposal of the mine.
Whilst this party was en route, it was decided to attempt to locate the exact position of the submarine by Asdic, this operation to be under the command of Commander Lambert (S.O.(I)), in view of his previous wide experience in Escort Groups under the leadership of the late Captain F. J. Walker, R.N. However, with every respect to all concerned, it was a far too optimistic party which set out in H.M.T. ANNET armed with the usual trawler type asdic, type 123D. Nevertheless, an echo of sorts was obtained, but nowhere near either of the marker pellets. Search concluded with dusk at 1730.
At 1800 Lieut. Nickson arrived from VERNON, and accompanied by him I reported to the Chief of Staff, where it was decided to continue the asdic search next day, co-opting the assistance of H. Nor. M. M.L. 573 with enthusiastic but defective echo sounder, the idea being to locate the submarine by the “creeping attack” method directed from the trawler.
To me, this all sounded very sound in theory, but as I have spent most of 1943 as First Lieut.- Act. CO of an even larger and much better fitted trawler, I fully appreciated the limitations of the asdic, and thus had little hope of their being much use. I suggested that a straightforward bottom sweep, used as either a single ship, or “A”: sweep would be more satisfactory, but the consensus of local opinion vetoed the idea on the grounds that there would be far too many obstructions on the harbour bottom. At 2245 Lieut. Gray and Sub. Lt. Howard Williams arrived in Dover, the VERNON Diving Vessel M.F.V. 1034 following during the night.
At 0900 on Sunday the 31st, a search with trawler and M.L commenced, and by 1330 a contact was located and danned. Unfortunately, despite the declaration of a dangerous area, traffic had been comparatively heavy overnight, and both original marker pellets were nowhere to be seen, but it was generally felt that the position as given by this asdic search was quite good, and it was decided to dive on this contact immediately. At 1535 S. Lt. Howard Williams was sent down, and for an hour he made a search of the area close westward of the dan, surfacing at 1632 to report very bad diving conditions, much mud and no sign of the wreck. It was then too late for a further effort to the eastward of the dan, so work was suspended for the night.
Accompanied by Lieut. Nickson, I reported the day’s work to the Chief of Staff. Later Lieut. Gray appeared, and after some discussion it was decided that the Mine Recovery Yacht ESMERALDA, of Portsmouth, should be sent for, as her echo sounding gear was of such a special type that it should easily locate such an object as a 30 ft. submarine. Not withstanding this, the Chief of Staff considered that a bottom sweep might well be tried after all, and so arrangements were made that pending the arrival of ESMERALDA, sweeping with an “A:” sweep between two motor cutters should commence next morning. For this purpose Lieut. Deverall, R.N. T.K.O. Dover, organised two such cutters, and by midnight a sweep, a good supply of gear, and plenty of dans were ready to start at first light next morning.
At 0845 on Monday, 1st January, the sweeping party, consisting of Lieut. Deverall, Lieut. Nickson, Lieut. Hindmarsh and myself, set out on the systematic sweep of a pre-arranged area. This was swept east-west without success, except that one of the original marker pellets was located, and was identified as being the second pellet dropped. Then a north-south traverse was begun, and when passing close eastward of the pellet at 1020, the sweep fouled an obstruction and held fast. This obstruction was obviously a large one, so I decided it would be well worth diving in this position. The diving vessel was still lying alongside in the penns, and no amount of calling with the Aldis could raise any reply, so I called up the Port War Signal Station requesting immediate assistance of divers, meantime keeping the sweep wires taught by going slow ahead on both engines. At about 1110 the cross-channel train ferry arrived at the harbour entrance, and was quite obviously going to have a very tricky entry if she was to avoid running us down. No divers had yet appeared, nor was there any sign of life in the diving vessel, so I considered it most unreasonable to block the major part of the fairway to so large a craft, and accordingly gave the order to shorten in the sweep. This gave the ferry room to pass uncomfortably close, but just as it passed the sweep wire freed and contact was lost. We immediately dropped a dan indicating the position within about 10-20 feet, and then seeing that further efforts would be futile until the diving vessel was at hand with diver all ready to go down, I sent the working party to dinner with plans to recommence sweeping at 1330.
At 1345 sweeping was once again in progress, and at 1430 the sweep again fouled the wreck. The diving boat was hailed, and subsequently anchored close by. I then shacked on a heaving line to one of the taut sweep wires, and sliding the shackle down the wire passed the other end of the heaving line to the diving boat. At 1600 the diver went down his shot rope, and on reaching the bottom, guided himself to the bight of the sweep with the heaving line. He surfaced again to report that the sweep was embedded in the mud, and he had not been able to follow it to the obstruction. It was nearly dark, so a further dan was laid at this spot, and once more the sweep hauled up-and-down, when, as before, it parted from the obstruction and was easily hauled in by hand. Work was then suspended for the night, and I proceeded to the Castle to make my evening report. I also rang the D.T.M.(I) reporting that although the diving was incredibly slow, we really believed we had located the submarine.
Later on the same evening, Monday, H.M.Y. Esmeralda arrived, and a further discussion took place between the Chief of Staff, Commander Callieu (H.M.Y. ESMERALDA), Lieut. Nickson and myself. It was then decided that ESMERALDA should carry out a careful echo sounder sweep and asdic sweep combined, as Cdr. Callieu expressed his opinion that he could identify the wreck comparatively simply. I pressed that the sweeping with bottom sweep should continue, as it in no way interfered with the ESMERALDA. The Chief of Staff strongly endorsed this, and issued instructions that the sweeping was to continue. If the sweep should foul a likely obstruction, this was to be dived upon without further delay. Still later, at 2230, I received a signal (originator unknown) , instructing me to report on board Esmeralda for orders, but as I already had these from the Chief of Staff, and as I now felt that far too much time was being spent conferring, and far too little with getting on with the job, I completed my sweeping arrangements with Lieut. Deverall, and having seen the sweeping commence at 0900 on Tuesday, 2nd, I obtained permission to leave the Dover Command and return to London, to give a detailed account of the work to Captain Maitland Dougall, D.T.M.(I). This done, I returned to Dover, arriving there at 2030. I contacted the duty Commander, who told me that apart from ESMERALDA’s return to harbour with defective asdic, there was nothing new to report. I then contacted Lieut. Deverall, who said that he had swept the southern half of the area all day, as the divers had been down on the position of the previous day’s contact in the northern half. He said that the divers had been down only to report that they could not find anything in that position.
Again on Wednesday, 3rd, the sweep was out by 0915, and having seen this underway, visited the Chief of Staff with a view to making plans to meet the situation when at last the submarine had been located and raised. The Chief of Staff said that except for one or two points, he intended to leave the whole organisation to me, but expressed his wish that every precaution should be taken both from the point of view of safety, and also of security. He suggested that a suitable point of beaching would be close westward of the hulk of the destroyer CODRINGTON, and asked if arrangements could be made so that his Duty Staff Officer in the Castle would be at all times conversant with the situation on the beach.
Sweeping well in progress, I set about making these arrangements, and thanks to the extraordinary helpful R.M.S.O. party, led by Lieut. Parker himself, everything I could possibly wish for was provided. Lorries, wires, sentries, Police and Military contacts were all made in a matter of a few hours, and before I could realise what was going on a party of men from the Royal Corps of Signals had laid a telephone line from the beach to the R.M.S.O.’s office. By Wednesday night everything was ready, and plans for beaching and rendering safe drawn up. Somewhat unusually elaborate precautions had to be taken, in view of the fact that the position of beaching was exactly in front of the sole remaining hotel in Dover, and the shell shattered buildings on the sea front could not be expected to stand up to the explosion of a torpedo and/or mine at a maximum range of 150 yards.
On Thursday morning the plans were submitted to the Admiral, and being approved in all respects, were issued as an order to all concerned. A copy of these orders is attached to this report. [report not held ED.].
By mid-day, ESMERALDA reported a first class contact near the eastern end of the area, and during the afternoon dans were laid with shot ropes on either side of the wreck. From the echo sounder trace it appeared that the wreck lay in a hollow, close under an almost vertical bank of mud. In general the diving party were very optimistic of this contact, and for the first time in several days, hopes were high.
During the afternoon the divers made further attempts to reach the wreck but owing to the unfavourable weather and the difficulty in getting down into the hollow where the wreck was said to lie, no successful efforts were forthcoming. By the end of this day, Thursday, the wind had reached force 6.
All this time the bottom sweep was systematically covering the area, but until Friday the only positive wreck snagged had been the one located on the Monday, close eastward of the No 2 pellet, but which could not be found by the divers. On Friday afternoon the sweep fouled another obstruction to the south east of this pellet, but on examination by the divers, it proved to be the wreck of an LCP, lost in August 1944.
During Friday the diving party laid a system of lines across the wreck in the hollow in order that the divers might climb down the mud bank, any other approach being impossible due to the consistency of the mud. By 1630 these lines were well in position and a diver was ready to go down, when once again the bottom sweeping party reported its sweep fast on a wreck. A check of the position showed that once more the sweep had fouled in the same position as that snagged on the two previous occasions, first on Monday afternoon when it had been necessary to clear the sweep to allow the ferry to pass, and again later on the same day when the divers had been unable to follow the sweep wire and had made a fruitless search the next morning. By this time, it was nearly dusk and was snowing intermittently, so further diving was suspended, the sweep wire being left fast to the wreck but well and truly danned.
On Saturday morning the sweeping party stood by whilst two divers began a search for the wreck in the hollow, and Sub. Lieut. Howard Williams went down the danned sweep wire. At 1230 Sub. Lieut. Williams surfaced to report that not only had he found a wreck but that the latter consisted of a long cylindrical object fitted with a turret, from which projected two short lengths of tube or pipe. On further diving this was found to be the submarine, and examination showed that she was lying on her starboard side in about 6 1/2 fms.
Whilst this diving was in progress, I was taking the opportunity to report to D.T.M.(I) and when the wreck was identified, I returned to Dover and contacted Commander Callieu for details. Later I saw Lieut. Gray who described the submarine in detail, and also the torpedo which he said was fitted in a form of strop release on the port side. He gave me a very clear description of the torpedo, from which I was able to deduce that the pistol was probably one of the Pi.2 series of non-contact magnetic pistols. I was not a little disturbed to hear that despite implicit orders to the contrary, he had “tested” the movement of the arming vane by rotating it. If this movement was sufficient to clock home the primer behind the non-return keep, and if, as he seemed to think, there was a strong possibility of the torpedo dropping clear of its strops on lifting, then despite the mousing of the propellers, the torpedo would be fully armed with current flowing to the unit. I spoke to Cdr. Callieu about this, and asked that not only should the mousing of the propellers be made doubly sure, but that a large strop should be passed right round the torpedo, and if possible the hull of the submarine.
This took all day Sunday 7th and by noon on Monday 8th, slings were in position, and the Dover salvage vessel DAPPER was ready to lift at ……[missing Ed.].
At 1500 on Monday 8th, Lt. Cd.r (El) Powell, Lieut. Parker and myself were ready with all the gear and tools in a beach defence pillbox, opposite the position where it was intended to land the torpedo and pump out the submarine. At 1910 the diving vessel berthed alongside the hulk of the Codrington, and a few moments later the Dapper called for leading lights. These were switched on, and from then onwards the pre-arranged danger and security period was declared, and all the roads to the area closed by the military. At 1930 Dapper decided that she was as near to the beach as safety permitted and so lowered the submarine to the bottom once more. Lifting wires were passed to the Codrington, and in a matter of moments both Dapper and the Diving Vessel were gone.
This beaching was far below expectations, for although Lt. Cdr. McFee had planned to beach the submarine abreast the inshore end of the hulk, in fact she was exactly abreast the outboard end. Tides being neaps, this meant that not only would the submarine fail to be high and dry at low water, but it was now a gamble whether the conning tower would break surface at all. However I decided that with a full five hours in hand to observe the rate and gradient of the fall, I would wait and see, but would have everything ready should the conning tower break surface not later than one hour before low water. I then ordered the motor cutter inshore and massing all hands both in and out of the water, we manhandled the two fire pumps provided by Lt Cdr Powell into the cutter. Whilst these were demonstrating their usual obstinacies to Lt. Cdr. Powell, I rigged a bridle between the cutter and the beach 300 feet away, by means of which I was able to hold the cutter in a favourable position above, and alongside the submarine. By this time the pumps were undoubtedly working – so satisfactorily – that one had sucked a large quantity into its innards, and had to be operated upon.
At 2200 the top of the periscope appeared, and with three hours to go things looked hopeful. Furthermore, the submarine was found to be on an even keel. Unfortunately I had under-estimated the height of the periscope, for by 2400 approx., some three feet of the tube was above water but no sign of the conning tower. Observing the gradient of the beach and the distance from the water’s edge, I felt that it was too much of a gamble to wait until low water, and decided to risk dragging the submarine, complete with torpedo, further inshore. I still had an hour in hand, so there was nothing to be lost by preparing this gear. Accordingly, the wire to the fore end of the submarine was passed to the shore and was led up and across the beach to the waiting lorry on the road. This proved a failure, because owing to the fact that it had been snowing intermittently and was now freezing hard, the lorry was unable to hold the road. Once again Lieut. Parker produced the ideal in the form of a 10 ton Sommell [? Ed.] fitted with electric winch, This arrived in a very short time, and bracing itself against the local memorial to some obscure battle, hauled away handsomely, whilst hands checked away on a line from the submarine to the Codrington, rigged as a safeguard against the submarine listing to port and burying the torpedo.
For about 15 feet the submarine rode inshore on an even keel, and then slowly listed 50 degrees to starboard. Having previously learned from the divers that no mine or torpedo was fitted on the starboard side, I continued heaving until the whole fore part of the submarine was clear of the water. In this position the torpedo was well exposed as far aft as the balance chamber. I might have hauled it high and dry, but felt it was best to hit a mean between damaging the starboard side of the submarine due to the weight of the torpedo, plus the weight of water inside the submarine, and the risk of electrical shortings due to spray when extracting the pistol. Being now ready to carry out this latter operation, I cleared all hands off the beach into the pillbox and began a detailed examination of the pistol.
PISTOL. The pistol was Pi 2 F., serial number 38640, fitted with solid nose boss and net cutters. The nose boss had originally been engraved Pi 2 C., but the letter C had been deliberately though incompletely obliterated, and the letter F punched instead. I noted that the main d.c. current switch was in the fore and aft position.
TORPEDO. The torpedo was a G.7.E of the T.3.series, serial number 57392, fitted with a Kb pattern warhead, serial number 84695. Net cutters, in the form of a cone shaped framework, were bolted round the afterbody and tail unit. This framework was stencilled T.11/T.111 in white letters. The whole torpedo appeared to be slung from a bar release mechanism fitted to the side of the submarine, and the torpedo housed close home with one single and one double metal strop or band. The method of release was apparently by some hydraulic means, in view of the system of pipes leading from the release bar to the hull, abreast the conning tower. To my surprise, the starting lever was fully exposed and was in the “started” position, i.e., drawn aft. From this I presumed that (a) the current to the pistol was switched on and (b) only the mousing of the propellers was preventing the torpedo from getting under way. I had foreseen this as a remote possibility and having obtained the necessary measurements by phone from RNTF was armed with a wooden wedge cut to fit the slot abaft the starting lever.
Rendering Safe. First I forced the starting lever into the forward position and inserted the wedge as a safeguard. Then I examined the pistol and found that the primer and detonators were not in the withdrawn position but had been wound down 315 out of a possible 355 revolutions, so I would back this arming range. Theoretically, the pistol should now have been in a fit state for withdrawal, but in view of the fact that the starting lever had been in the “on” position, I felt that I should make certain that I had broken the d.c. current supply to the pistol unit. This was the first specimen of a Pi 2 F torpedo, and previous specimens of the Pi 2 series had produced conflicting information on the working of the d.c. cut-out switch S.2. According to an American report of a Pi 2 C, this switch was in the “off” position when fore and aft, whereas another specimen of the Pi 2 C recovered by the British was found to have a switch which was “off” in the athwartships position. I had found this Pi 2 F in the fore and aft position, so I recorded the fact to the pillbox, and turning the switch to the athwartships position to remove the pistol. Two of the four body bolts holding the net cutters to the nose unscrewed easily, but the normal spanner would not cope with the two bolts on the inboard side. Fortunately, I had a mine “bomb-fuse” spanner with me, and after some cutting and filing was made to fit. For future operations a special tool must be made for this purpose. I withdrew the pistol retaining bolts, built a ramp of shingle and an old cushion, and using the prescribed lanyard (reduced to 200 feet in view of the lack of space), withdrew the pistol. This was then put in a safe place for further rendering safe.
The tide was now well on the flood, so I decided to get the torpedo out of the submarine, and to haul the latter further up the beach before pumping out. With regard to the release of the torpedo, I considered that the position of the release levers, and the pressure in the hydraulic system (if such it was) were possibly valuable information, and therefore decided to release the torpedo by dismantling the strops and allowing it to roll clear. This done, we hauled it clear quite easily, and using sheets of galvanised iron as a skidway, hauled the torpedo right up to the roadside.
I then tried to open the conning tower hatch in order to pump out the submarine but no amount of persuasion would shift the clamps inside. However the water, or rather the dilute solution of sulphuric acid inside, had softened the Perspex scuttle of the hatch, so I broke this and was able to reach the clamps. Quite a lot of water ran out until the body of the occupant blocked the flow, so once more we shackled on the tow, and relaying the skidway, hauled the whole submarine tight up the beach. This latter using a portable crane, to load it straight on to the railway, which, by good fortune, divides the beach from the road. Before attempting the steep gradient at the top of the beach (grad 1 in 1 1/2) I decided to pump out completely, and whilst this was in progress Lieut. Parker and his party dug away a large part of the shingle bank.
The next move was to remove the body of the “pilot” so we, Lt Cdr Powell and I donned Salvus gear as a protection against gas and other “decomposition products” and a violent struggle took place to get the body out – a highly distasteful business. It was most interesting to observe the reaction on the ratings, who had spent most of their service doing excellent work but in shore establishments, as against those who were only ashore because their previous close contact with the Hun had left them maimed for life. In a very short time the pumps were under way, and we took the opportunity to change into some dry clothes, some of us having been wet to the waist since the loading of the pumps into the cutter in the early evening.
The hull empty, a set of stirrup pumps were manned, and the whole of the inside of the submarine and in particular all the electrical gear, well sprayed down with some 300 gallons of distilled water we had prepared beforehand. I had learned from Lt. Cdr. Powell that much, if not all, of the corrosion of electrical apparatus due to sea water can be prevented by this method, and thanks to his assistance, I was able to put it into operation. One point of possible interest which I noted, was that apart from a very faint smell of bromine – as distinct from chlorine – there was a very pronounced smell of thymol. In the early stages this was quite strong enough to mask the nauseating odours, and when at one stage in the removal of the body I was obliged to take off my Salvus gear, I experienced no unpleasant qualms of any sort.
Final pumping out completed, I felt that all hands could do with a hot breakfast, and so the time being 0630 we covered the submarine and the toppedo with camouflage netting put the pistol in the pillbox with military guard and suspended all work until 0900, Accompanied by Lt. Cdr. Powell and Lieut. Parker I drove to the Castle, taking with us all papers and other intelligence matter for S.O.(I). I then reported by phone to D.T.M. London.
After breakfast we returned to the scene of operation, and in daylight but in a much heavier snow storm than before, made a careful examination of the interior of the submarine. This was just as well, for underneath the seat there was a scuttling charge of the conventional pattern and a length of 9 second delay fuse. There was also an object in the engine compartment which I could not identify. It consisted of a cylindrical tube about 12 inches long by 1 inch diameter, painted red with a white band. On one end was fitted a pair of brackets which might be described as being similar to those fitted to the base of a pump used to inflate motor tyres by hand. On the other end there was a 1 second delay fuse. The bottom of the bracketed end of the object was badly corroded, and subsequently fell off. I removed these charges to a safe place, searched for more, but found none. One thing that did come to light was a bottle hidden under the seat, and inside was a document in English, which, romantic as it read, appeared to have some bearing upon the capture of the submarine, and possibly the explanation why the pilot had met his end. This bottle was passed on to Naval Intelligence with the rest of the gear. There were no bullet holes in the hull, nor could I see any obvious reason why the submarine had sunk. This finished with the submarine, and it was then passed into the custody of S.O.(I) for disposal.
I then parted the warhead from the body of the torpedo, and as expected, I found the usual “pancake” battery in the rear end of the warhead. I also noted that the battery chamber was in very short supply, certainly not more than half full. Externally, the torpedo was normal, though I noticed a small glass window in one of the inspection plates in the afterbody. This appeared to be of opal glass, but quite probably this was due to condensation inside the torpedo.
A railway truck, loco and crane then arrived, and I loaded the whole torpedo into it, the body for onward routing to S.T.E.D and the warhead to Priddy’s Hard. Returning to the pistol, I took this along the beach away from the ever gathering crowd of “Interested Persons” and unscrewing the unit housing, withdrew the primer and detonators. These were of the normal type. Examining the d.c. cut-out switch, I particularly noted the state of the movement. In this case the switch was in the “on” position when the external keyway was in the fore and aft position, and, of course, in the “Off” position when the external key was in the athwartships position. I passed the primer and detonators to the local B.S.O., Lt. Davis, and taking the pistol with me proceeded to the Castle to make my final report to the Chief of Staff. He presented my report to the Admiral, who examined the pistol and having heard of my request for permission to return to the Admiralty, provided me with one of his cars to do so.
I reported the completion of the job by telephone to Captain Maitland Dougall, who instructed me to make a special survey of the battery compartment of the torpedo before leaving, so I postponed my departure until the next day, Wednesday, and after lunch returned to the dockyard to carry out the examination. Unfortunately, the local A.S.O. had been obliged to unload the torpedo, and had stowed it in the magazine tunnel, with by no means the best light for such an inspection. It was snowing hard outside, so there was nothing for it but to crawl inside the torpedo to count and measure the batteries. These could be seen through the usual inspection ports, but owing to the cramped space and the poor light I could not be certain of the measurements and the size. I noted that, from inside the torpedo, a small metal box, similar to the ballast box in the torpedo recovered from the Seine Bay (Baby of Mother and Baby), was fitted just forward of the after bank of batteries. There were 26 cells of standard size, Battery serial 13. This concluded the whole operation, and so I returned to H.M.S. LYNX at 1715.
Throughout the whole operation one thought was very much in my mind, viz. How exceptionally thoughtful and helpful everyone was in Dover, and in particular Lieut. Commander Powell, and Lieut. Parker. I cannot speak too highly of their efforts, not only to provide the very best gear, and in good supply, but to anticipate my every wish. They, and their working party, under the direction of P.O. Humphrey, worked tirelessly, and with an enthusiasm that was a pleasure to watch. Quite early on the Monday evening most of the party got wet almost to the waist, but despite the freezing cold, not one would leave the scene of operations until the job had been completed.
Lieut. Parker calls for special mention, in, that with the approval of his Chief of Staff he volunteered to help me to relay the skidway whilst the live torpedo was being dragged up the beach, and later to assist in the unscrewing of the pistol from the head.
Shortly before I left Dover for the Admiralty on Wednesday morning I received a signal from the Admiral, copy of which is attached.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
Lieutenant, R.N.V.R
Biography of Captain James Verdon Steele GM CD RCN (retd)
Captain Steele was born in Tralee, Ireland and after a brief stint in the Merchant Navy, joined the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in 1940. He became a Torpedo Specialist and served both in the Mediterranean and in Arctic convoys. As Navigating Officer in HMS Bedouin, he was torpedoed and sunk off the island of Pantelleria. After commanding a local escort group based in Gibraltar, he was appointed to the Admiralty to join the Bomb and Mine Disposal Section. This group was responsible for all unexploded ordinance below the high water mark around the UK, and in the general London area in support of the Army.
When the German Navy perfected the electrically driven torpedo which left no visible track, he was inserted into Occupied Europe to confirm suspicions that a factory in Northern Germany, ostensibly making dental equipment, was in fact manufacturing the key parts of this new weapon. He remained behind enemy lines working with the Resistance until the liberation. After the war, he transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy and served there until his retirement in 1962 when he went on to a second career in ship brokering and the development of oil spill recovery vessels. He was awarded the George Medal by H.M. King George VI for his rendering safe the midget submarines used in the attacks on UK South Coast ports.