The British War Council and many of its advisors were willing to believe that sea power could open the way to Constantinople. It led to the grave underestimation by all concerned on the determination with which the enemy – Turkey – would defend its homeland. Captain John A. Robertson who was in 1975 commanding officer of HMAS Stalwart, gives a talk entitled ‘Gallipoli and Sea-power’ and is a study of that historic and still controversial campaign, and the lessons that could have been learnt. Although Churchill’s schemes were many and various, they had one factor in common: they sought not just to defeat the German fleet but to use British naval power to shorten the duration of the war on land. After the ill-fated naval attack in the Dardanelles that lasted from 19 February to 18 March, it proved that not for the first time during the First World War a strategic concept had come unstuck because the tactics required for its successful implementation were beyond the abilities of the force employed.
Recorded on 2nd May 1975
Duration is 33 minutes.
Note that photos and diagrams referred to in this address are not included in this audio-only podcast.
