- Author
- A.N. Other
- Subjects
- Naval Intelligence, History - WW1, WWI operations
- Tags
-
- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- March 2013 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
By Midshipman Michael Carpenter, RAN.
Midshipman Michael Carpenter was born and raised in Adelaide, completing his secondary studies in 2007. Michael studied commerce at the University of South Australia in 2009, before joining the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2010 as a Royal Australian Air Force trainee. After graduating with a business degree in 2011, Michael transferred to the Royal Australian Navy as a Maritime Warfare Officer, completing New Entry Officer Course 47 at HMAS Creswell in November 2012.
‘We manage the job in Europe. They’ll manage it against the Yankees, Japs, and Chinese, as occasion requires out there.’
Admiral Sir John Fisher1
Introduction
One of the many developments that encapsulated the imperialistic nature of late nineteenth century great power politics was significant colonisation throughout many parts of the world, particularly throughout South East Asia. Both the United States and Japan were growing in influence and by 1899 Germany had acquired possessions in Samoa, New Guinea, the Carolines and the Marianas. These developments, and indeed the prospect of a German naval presence of any kind, would have appeared as a significant threat in the event of war given that Australia relied almost exclusively on sea-based trade revenue as the lifeblood of a young, developing nation. The formation of an independent naval force, however, was frustrated by the expectation of a battle of great fleets in the North or Atlantic Seas, and the resultant concentration of forces away from periphery theatres such as the Pacific. Consequently, prior to 1909 Australia’s naval expansion diminished to the point where ‘…not one British Admiral took the Australian naval forces seriously or expected them to make any serious contribution to Imperial defence.’2.
Despite this complex political relationship with Britain and competing strategic interests within the Empire, the Royal Australian Navy was, at the outbreak of War in 1914, a formidable blue water fleet more than capable of challenging the German Pacific threat; a position that Australia benefited from following the 1909 ‘naval scare’. Indeed, less than one year following the declaration of war, all German Pacific colonies had been captured through coalition efforts, the German East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron was forced from the theatre (and later destroyed) and two oceans would be secured for the remainder of the war – all of which was accomplished well before the ANZAC legend was born on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Battle of Jutland in 1916 sealed the fate of Germany’s naval ambition – if it could not control the seas around Europe then it was impossible to offer anything other than limited resistance in foreign seas.
This essay will examine how the Royal Australian Navy was able to achieve these successes through the evolution of strategic thinking between 1909 and 1914, and how this sparked one of the few naval arms races in Australian history. Particular analysis surrounding the tactical manoeuvre involved in the capture of German colonies such as New Guinea is inconsequential, given that fighting lasted for only a few days against what was a small native constabulary garrison. The broader consequences of this campaign, however, demonstrate that the Australian fleet possessed ‘…range, power and operational reach… sufficient to deter the Germans from challenging its strength in the broader maritime interfaces which were vital to Australia.’3 Such outcomes demonstrate the importance of sound maritime doctrine today, based upon the experiences of a campaign almost a century old.
A new strategic imperative
The immediate pre-war period was typified by conflict between regional security priorities in the Pacific theatre and the need for a strong Dominion fleet on one hand, and the need to concentrate naval forces for greater effect in the European theatre on the other. The role that a Dominion naval force could be expected to play as anything more than an extension of the Royal Navy was still unclear given this dichotomy, and the dominance of ideas proposed by theorist Alfred Mahan gave weight to the traditional battleship fleet operating concept. The fleet unit concept of 1909, first proposed by Admiral Sir John Fisher, began to drastically shift strategic thinking away from a blue water clash of naval heavyweights, towards an autonomous, independent naval force in the Pacific and other periphery theatres as the most appropriate way of investing in the defence of Empire.
The fleet unit concept was born following the 1909 ‘naval scare.’ This was a spontaneous and far-reaching reaction following advice from Reginald McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, that German Dreadnought production would soon surpass that of the British. Such a threat to naval superiority was to be dealt with by increasing the construction demands on capital ships to the point where the combined output of the previous three years was to be completed again in just one. Although the Dominions could hardly afford any resources to assist with such an undertaking, an offer of one Dreadnought was made as a sign of mutual support from Prime Minister Alfred Deakin. Such offers of support were not grounded in the realities facing the Australian treasury, and as such never transpired into any tangible support.
Continuing to Grow
Fisher’s alternative to the Mahan-influenced battle fleet paradigm was a flotilla defence, enabled by ‘mosquito squadrons’ of torpedo craft and submarines. Although this role was occupied at the time by the cruiser squadrons in their capacity as an imposing deterrent, the ‘mutual sea denial’ afforded by this new system would integrate well with the needs of home defence – namely the absence of any intention to invade the European mainland. With growing cruiser development between the European powers beginning to encroach on the supremacy of the Royal Navy, relegating the main battle fleets to a secondary role was deemed to be too risky and ultimately abandoned. It was now that Australia’s promise of one Dreadnought became a lifeline for Fisher’s flotilla concept, and ultimately became the first modern force structure adopted by Australian naval forces. It also provided a framework for the consolidation of the Royal Australian Navy as an independent entity:
‘Ultimately, it could be argued that the RAN was conceived as the exemplar of the new model navy intended to protect the British Empire into the twentieth century.’4
The Henderson Plan of 1911 built upon Fisher’s work, the primary purpose of which was to continue the formulation of doctrinal elements associated with the new flotilla that extended beyond coastal defence, and to also establish the groundwork for infrastructure to sustain not only the vessels themselves but also the professional crews required to operate them. Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson came to Australia in 1910 to provide recommendations for the implementation of these aims. Many outcomes of the Henderson Plan are still visible today, particularly in terms of the distribution of principal bases. The composition of Henderson’s proposed fleet was of the order of eight battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 18 destroyers and 12 submarines, among other auxiliary type vessels. At the outbreak of war, Australia’s year old fleet had only one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, two destroyers and two submarines. Although the ideal fleet composition proposed was estimated to be achieved in a 22 year period, Australia still found itself in a position of great strength over its German rivals, with the flagship HMAS Australia considerably more powerful than its closest opponents in Gneisenau and Scharnhorst.
The First Campaign
The justification for the existence of the Royal Australian Navy and how it integrated into a global strategic concept of Empire continued to be questioned throughout the formative pre-war years. Again, the concept of decentralised control of an independent force was at odds with the ‘one single navy’ policy, which was presumably founded on the simple principle of concentration of force. Such an instance occurred in 1913 when Winston Churchill appeared to reverse previous agreements with Australia by failing to provide a battle cruiser for service in the Pacific as negotiated in 1909, believing that it was not necessary. Moreover, suggestions began to circulate that the Admiralty were planning to send HMAS Australia to Gibraltar without engaging in dialogue with the Australian command. By 1914, the Australian War Staff had lost faith in the reliability of the Admiralty to provide support to the Pacific squadron policy, again as a victim of strategic disagreement. It seems that, in hindsight, had such proposals been carried out then the position of Australian dominance described above would never have existed, and the German fleet would have been able to cause significant damage to vital commercial shipping. Rather, it was the presence of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst that prompted the Australian government to retain Australia in the Pacific, which was described by Von Spee as ‘…an adversary so much stronger than our squadron that we should be bound to avoid it.’
Although the Royal Australian Navy clearly held the upper hand over its German rivals, there was still disagreement about how the Navy was to be used. The Commander of the Australian Squadron, Admiral Sir George Patey, proposed that an offensive against the German fleet should be undertaken as the first priority. This was turned down, however, in favour of a support role as part of attacks on the German colonies, a decision made far from the region in Whitehall, and based on the belief that ‘… the task of rounding up German warships would be facilitated if the Germans were to be deprived of their overseas bases which provided fuel, provisions and above all, wireless communications.’5 The role of the Australian squadron was of little consequence in any case, given that Von Spee and the majority of his fleet began steaming for South America in mid August of 1914.
The Australian assignment was to attack wireless communication stations in the Carolines, Nauru and New Guinea – all of which were important strategic assets that allowed control over the German fleet in the vast expanses of the Pacific, in addition to monitoring Australian fleet movements. Rabaul, a natural harbour and the capital of German New Guinea, was the first objective given to the newly formed Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) under the command of Colonel William Holmes. Accompanied by Australia, HMAS Sydney and escorts the assault commenced on 11 September 1914 and concluded the next day following minor skirmishes against a small and poorly organised garrison. Again it must be emphasised that the milestone this campaign represents draws little from the actions leading to the capture of the German colonies or the tactical processes involved. Rather it is the events prior to the war and the resultant effects of conflicting strategic direction that explain why the Royal Australian Navy was able to accomplish what it did during the first months of the war.
Conclusion
This analysis has outlined some of the events during the pre-war period from 1909 to 1914 that contributed to the capacity of the Royal Australian Navy to wage war in the Pacific during the opening stages of the First World War. The Allied campaign in the Pacific in 1914-15 allowed the Royal Australian Navy to taste success for the first time, with Odgers explaining that ‘The prime motive for the expeditions against the German colonies was not the conquest of colonial territory, but primarily as a contribution to the elimination of all overseas German naval power.’6 The position of dominance that Australian forces were able to project in the Pacific was the product of a lack of German defences, a workable force structure for the Australian squadron and recognition of the need for decentralisation that completely opposed the prevailing Imperial strategy preceding the War. Before 1909, Australian naval power was something of a novelty, or at least a force without any strategic justification through the lens of an Empire-wide naval defence strategy. These attitudes changed following the naval scare of 1909, after which Australia participated in a global process of naval development, while also adopting new models such as the flotilla defence proposed by Fisher, and the Henderson Plan as a means of sustaining what was a unique endeavour for a dominion to undertake under British auspices and, on occasion, interference.
The Navy was able to achieve its successes because its command prioritised regional threats and adopted a posture that placed the navy in a position to challenge the German fleet on a technical as well as a tactical level. The road taken from insignificance to complete control of the Pacific (without comparison in absolute terms to the Japanese navy of the day) is a multifaceted one, involving strategic and political factors that have only been touched upon briefly in this essay. As war correspondent of the day A. W. Jose stated, “In July of that fateful year [1914] hardly any non-official Australians – and very few officials – dreamt that war was coming; but very many were eager to ensure that, if ever war did come, the Australian Navy should take a worthy and may be a splendid part in it.’7.
Editorial Note: For reasons of space, the bibliography and many endnotes have been omitted. The full text of this essay is available upon request to the Naval Historical Society.
Notes:
- Letter, Fisher to Esher, 13 September 1909, cited in Stevens, D. (ed.) 1997, In Search of a Maritime Strategy, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, p. 44.
- Lambert, N. Sir John Fisher, the fleet unit concept, and the creation of the Royal Australian Navy, cited in Stevens, D. 2001, Southern Trident, Allen & Unwin, New South Wales, p. 216.
- Australian Department of Defence (Navy), An Outline of Australian Naval History – The RAN in World War 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976, p. 216.
- Ibid, p. 224.
- Odgers, G. The Royal Australian Navy – An Illustrated History, Child & Henry Australia, New South Wales, 1982, p. 52.
- Grey, J. op. cit, p. 52.
- Jose, A.W. Official History of Australia in the War 1914-1918, Vol. IX, 11th Edn, Sydney, 1943