- Author
- A.N. Other
- Subjects
- Ship design and development, History - post WWII, Infrastructure and Facilities, Australian Warships
- Tags
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- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- June 2023 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
By John Ingram
Fifty years ago, the Whitlam Labor government cancelled the troubled Light Destroyer (DDL) project and set in place the acquisition of six patrol frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry class. This major acquisition was to ultimately become the ADF’s first billion dollar plus ship purchase.
By 1973 there was an urgent need to replace the three Daring class destroyers, the last of the true gunships. The following year, 1974, a select panel of experts nominated as a replacement the British Type 42 destroyer, or the American Perry class patrol frigate, designated FFG-7. The Type 42 was in production and of a proven design, albeit a costly option. Conversely, the FFG-7 was still in the design stage. The then Defence Minister (Lance Barnard) preferred the FFG‑7 due to its perceived value for money and lessons learned by the RAN during the Vietnam War, especially intra-operability with the USN.
The RAN assessment team at the time described the FFG-7 as ‘a second-rate escort that falls short of the DDL requirements in virtually every aspect.’ A prescient description which was to prove correct in many ways.
Nevertheless, in 1974 the Whitlam Labor government announced provisional approval for the purchase of an initial two FFG-7s at a projected cost of US$50 million each. This controversial decision was confirmed in 1976 by the Fraser Coalition government with a third ship ordered in 1977 and a fourth in 1980. The first four frigates were all to be built at Todd Shipyard (Seattle). Hulls 05 and 06 were also ordered in 1980 with the build contract awarded to Amecon of Williamstown, Victoria. `
In this article, I discuss some of the more important issues that arose and how solutions were found. If asked to describe one singular characteristic of this project I would say ‘compromise,’ a definition of which is ‘the expedient acceptance of standards that are lower than is desirable.’
It reflects upon the impact of compromise when assessing Australia’s defence needs. Compromise may appear to save both the tight ADF dollar as well as acquisition lead times but, as this article reveals, is that in our nation’s best interest?
Firstly, let me explain the bigger management picture and some of the many challenges faced by the small Australian FFG-7 project staff in the Canberra office.
The Australian Project Office and PMS 399
Overall project management for this USN 55 ship build program was assigned to Naval Sea Systems Command located at Crystal City, VA USA with the Project Team assigned the code NAVSEA PMS 399. Embedded in this project team were two Australian public servants while at the Todd Seattle ship yard two Australian civilian Senior Technical Officers (STOs) oversaw construction of the Australian designated hulls. A small Australian Project Office was established at Campbell Park offices, Canberra with the primary objective of interface liaison with PMS 399 to ensure a smooth transition of the frigates into the Australian Fleet.
The contract agreement signed between the Australian Government (GoA) and the US Government (USG) specifically stated ‘ownership’ of the Australian ships would not take place until the ships were commissioned into the USN and, in back-to-back ceremonies, the USN ensign lowered as the Australian ensign was raised.
Nobody then appreciated just how much less room we had for manoeuvre compared with our building experience with the DDGs. These were to be straight USN ships.
The ‘working relationship’ between PMS 399 and the Canberra project office was invariably professional and candid. Annual visits to and from the USA by key project personnel, including the Seattle build site, resolved outstanding issues.
ILS, or Integrated Logistics Support
This acquisition programme not only introduced a new ship propulsion system and new weapons systems into the RAN, but a new logistics management concept known as ILS, the principal advocate being none other than the former US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara. Buying into this programme also entailed the mandatory acceptance of this new philosophy with its quite profound implications in the RAN for the entire life-cycle of more than 20 years of the ships involved.
The formation of two Working Groups within the Australian Project Office was crucial to effective logistical support and hence the achievement of very high ship operational ability. These were the Maintenance Group of five technical personnel led by a very experienced lieutenant commander and the Supply Group, led by a senior public servant. These teams worked together, reviewing the US supplied Allowance Lists system by system and making effective determinations as to criticality, cost, lead times and existing holdings of assemblies and spares. As a complete unit the FFG comprises a total range of around 500,000 inventory items, and many hard decisions had to be made to reduce that to a manageable, affordable level and still be able to achieve unprecedented levels of the platform’s operational ability.
Operational availability was a key factor. The FFG-7 was designed for, and achieved, results commonly 20% or better than other ship classes in the RAN, including the highly regarded DDG. To achieve a figure of 80% or better, the FFG required reliable, proven systems, a competent well-trained crew and, most importantly, effective logistical support. The ILS Plan was conceived as the ‘holy grail’ to realise this worthy objective.
The Minimum Manning or ‘Low Mix/Min Man’ concept
In 1975 the US Congress directed the size of the US fleet was to be halved as a result of the cost implications of the ten-plus years of the Vietnam War. This had a massive impact on fleet operations. ‘Doing more with (far) less’ resources became the catchcry. Manpower demanding and war weary destroyers and frigates were decommissioned rather than refitted and modernised. The ‘cheap’ and quick-to-build FFG-7 class was seen as an acceptable fix to meet the USN’s global maritime obligations.
New Systems
With a readily available power plant, the proven General Electric LM2500 engine (the marinised version of the jet engines that powered the DC-10 then in use with many airlines), a single shaft with a CRP (controllable reversible pitch propeller); a suite of weapons, navigation, and communications systems in common use in the USN (and to a lesser extent in the RAN in the DDGs of the Adams class in particular), these frigates were welcomed for their relative simplicity and numbers.
In the FFGs there were other weapons new to the RAN including the Harpoon missile, the Oto Melara 76 mm gun, the Vulcan Phalanx point defence system and the 324 mm torpedo, plus of course the 2 x S-70 Seahawk helicopters, which greatly enhanced the operational and surveillance effectiveness of these ships.
While these proven systems comprised the ‘Low Mix’ half of the concept, the ‘Min/Man(power)’ half was a different kettle of fish altogether and caused much grief in the RAN when developing the scheme of complement where ranks, trades and skill levels did not necessarily align. This was especially the case in the engineering department with the change from the intensive manning needs of steam turbines and associated boilers and evaporators, to the relative simplicity of the gas turbines, reduction gearbox and CRP propeller.
With the ship’s complement comprising both genders, the ceiling was 176, with additional berthing for 45 whenever FAA aviation personnel were embarked. In similar sized warships, such as the Daring class, the peacetime complement was 300. No department in a ship readily accepts reduction in manning levels. In fact, it took two years of intensive negotiations with Navy Office directorates to reach agreement as to the precise composition of the ranks and skill levels comprising the 176 personnel in the scheme of complement. Most personnel required training in the US, both at Navy facilities in the Chicago IL and Long Beach CA areas and at contractor/supplier sites for periods ranging from one to eighteen months. This was especially the case in the Marine Engineering department as no RAN personnel had experience with gas turbines and related propulsion equipment.
Travel costs
Following commissioning into the RAN, each of the four US-built ships was contractually obligated to undergo 12 months of trials, work up, warranty maintenance and so forth on the US west coast. This prolonged period meant all personnel were overseas for at least 15 months, many for 24 months. This became a very costly exercise especially in the case of personnel with families, many of whom were housed in commercial accommodation, initially in Seattle WA and later in the Long Beach/San Diego area of California.
Travel costs were massive and a constant drain on project training costs. One irony of departmental rules then in place enabled personnel with one or more children of a certain age to travel first class on long haul flights. Hence, the situation arose where on a QANTAS flight to Seattle many junior sailors and officers, spouses and children rode up front while their commanding officer and spouse were in economy class. To address this anomaly, RAAF assistance was sought and they obliged by airlifting personnel in their B707 aircraft thereafter.
Technical publications and drawings posed a major problem as the USN had changed its policy with the coming of the computer age. Contractually, the DDG class acquisition in the previous decade delivered to Australia 16 hard copies of every technical publication, ship and system drawing and supporting documentation. Those were distributed to shipyards, Navy Office directorates and selected contractors as well as each DDG holding a complete library, which occupied a lot of space and the need for microfiche readers and printers.
In the FFG an administrative computer (another ‘first’ for the RAN) was installed in the sole Ship’s Office, occupied by both administrative and technical staffs. With no allocated space onboard for a library, all technical publications and drawings were digitised. Only six hard copies of the estimated 5000 publications and 12,000 drawings were supplied to the RAN. While this angered the shipyards and some Navy Office directorates, there was a realisation that a change in paper management was needed and inevitable. Users eventually accepted the limitations of accessing data via computers.
There is no Defence policy…
While computer-aided technology was common in ship’s weapon systems and sensors, the ADF’s acceptance of computers for administrative purposes was problematic. A hand written minute from none other than the then Secretary of the Defence Department queried the installation of a computer for administrative purposes in the FFGs by the RAN adding ‘there was no Defence policy for such equipment’ and it was to be removed from the ships and the costs reclaimed. The Secretary was informed in a carefully worded response that these were not RAN ships at that stage and, under the terms of the contract, they were being built to USN contractual specifications. PMS 399 in the meantime advised the cost of each computer was USD$12,000 and, hypothetically to remove from each ship, $20,000.
There was no response from the Secretary but that single ship’s office computer was used for all official correspondence, pay and accounting, as well as accessing all technical documents and drawings. In essence, that basic desktop computer was critical to the ship’s effective management.
To expedite the development of the very comprehensive spare parts allowance lists in the Canberra project office an enterprising Petty Officer (Electrical) had brought his personal computer to work. This enabled quick and accurate transfer of data into the Supply system in Sydney and for orders to be placed. However, while doing his security rounds one evening a federal police officer at Campbell Park offices spotted this computer and reported it to higher authority. We were directed to remove the offending computer from the building. As a result, the Petty Officer was authorised to work from home thereafter. Problem solved.
The matter of Navy Office directorates and senior officers attempting to get changes to ship specifications during the acquisition phase was an ongoing problem. Canberra-based project staff became very skilled at saying ‘no, that is not possible. I refer you to the contract between the US and Australian governments’.
Some requests for alterations and additions made sense and the proposals were deferred until the ships commissioned into the RAN. Others were quite daft, including a certain commanding officer (designate) who sought to arrange with the shipbuilder to have his bridge chair repositioned as ‘he didn’t like driving from that location’. Another request was received from a flag rank officer who queried the tiny bridge controls at the helmsman’s position (a joystick for steering and a vernier for engine movements). He considered a traditional ship’s wheel would be more in keeping with the RAN.
However, on one visit to Seattle both Australian STOs assigned to oversee construction of two hulls, (later to become HMA Ships Adelaide and Canberra), expressed alarm regarding the quality of the welding and metal preservation. The Todd employees were inexperienced Korean nationals and had been given only limited training. On some pretext the STOs gained Todd approval for me to inspect both hulls one Sunday afternoon. Their concerns were obvious: where continuous welding was specified, such as in watertight compartments and gas citadels, spot welding was the norm and of very poor quality. In the double bottoms the enclosed metal surfaces had not been rust treated and preserved prior to sealing. (Postscript: the double bottoms of all four ships were opened and preserved properly at their first refits in Australia and manhole access points installed for future inspection and maintenance).
Shipbuilder negligence
Of even greater concern was the outer hull. Where the modules were welded together, instead of a smooth join a lead putty filler compound had been applied up to 100 mm in thickness! While this treatment certainly helped smooth the hull, the implications in anti-submarine warfare were obvious. It also confirmed that the shipbuilder was negligent in supervision of the fabrication task.
The STOs confirmed they’d been raising their concerns to Todd management and believed the Australian Project Office was aware of the situation. As I was returning directly to Canberra the following day, I agreed to convey photos of the substandard workmanship plus a jar containing rust scraped from within the double bottoms. This evidence was attached to my Visit Report which very quickly found its way to the desk of the then CNS (Chief of Naval Staff). It was a blunt, unconventional way of resolving the issues concerned, but without appropriate remedial action the RAN would have acquired four sub-standard ships.
Australian Industry Participation (AIP) or similar terminology is inherent in all offshore Defence procurement programmes and is a worthy objective, rarely secured to any degree. In the case of the FFG-7 the figure agreed in the contract was an arbitrary 30%. This meant PMS 399 and Todd Shipyard were required to offset 30% of the total costs in Australia (labour and/or materials). In the project office we tried very hard to induce local firms to become involved.
There was some success in that Port Kembla Steelworks agreed to produce HY80 steel (the special type used in the FFG hull) and welding rods. The Ordnance Factory, Bendigo agreed to the production and ongoing maintenance of the Oto Melara 76 mm gun mount, Standard missile launcher and the CRP propeller and hub. Air New Zealand, operating the DC10 aircraft, was contracted to provide depot level maintenance for the GE LM-2500 gas turbines, but this could not be included as AIP.
We did have success with welding rods but little else. Multiple types of pumps are fitted in warships and Todd was crediting the AIP account with significant numbers. That was until we discovered the pumps were being made in Japan for an Australian company who had the pumps shipped directly to Seattle. A smart commercial practice, but neither ethical nor acceptable when claiming AIP credits.
Risk factors
The FFG-7 was both versatile and fitted with systems novel to the RAN. But these came with risk factors that had to be addressed prior to introduction into service. Some of these risks are discussed below.
Draught
Not only was the frigate single screwed, but the loom of the 17’6” propeller was beneath the keel. Overall draught was 22 feet (6.7 m) compared to that of its predecessor, the Daring class of destroyer of just 12.75 feet. This fact was of special concern, not only to the ships’ bridge watchkeeping officers, but to the engineering department and the naval dockyards. At Garden Island and Fleet Base East we had to have debris removed from the harbour by Navy divers to ensure potential obstacles did not pose a threat.
CRP propeller
In the project office we were very conscious of this risk and had contracted OFB Bendigo to manufacture a spare propeller, a very complex task requiring special manufacturing techniques and equipment. However, when Adelaide grounded in 1980 during a high-speed turn in Puget Sound, this spare was not available, the contract having been cancelled by higher authority as a cost saving measure. Fortunately, PMS 399 intervened and arranged for a propeller to be removed from an FFG hull under construction. The OFB Bendigo order was then reinstated. Just as well as Canberra was later to wipe her propeller on a submerged obstruction in Newcastle harbour.
Interestingly one of the requirements stipulated in the FFG-7 ILS Plan was for the propeller and CRP hub (combined weight of over 4 tonnes) to be removed and replaced by ship divers without the need for the frigate to be docked down.
Single shaft
The RAN had no experience with single shaft warships. Executive Branch officers were especially critical of the potentially increased vulnerability. Some comfort was derived from the fact the FFG had twin electric APUs or Auxiliary Propulsion Units. Fitted midships either side, they performed like outboard motors, yet flush with the hull when housed. Depending on weather, sea state and parasitic drag caused by weed growth on the hull, they could move the ship at 4–7 knots, ideal for berthing and unberthing as they obviated the need for tugs, or when operational requirements necessitated silent manoeuvering.
Replacement gas turbine
Another ILS Plan requirement stipulated that a defective gas turbine and its protective coffin be removed and replaced by ship’s engineering personnel within 48 hours whilst alongside. This was made possible as the coffin was mounted on tram tracks, horizontal then vertical, exiting via the frigate’s small funnel. The first unscheduled change-out of a gas turbine needed by an RAN FFG occurred in the Middle East.
Over-the-horizon missiles
The Mk 13 launcher fired both the Standard missile and the Harpoon, the latter with an Over the Horizon (OTH) capability, a first for the RAN. The Rules of Engagement needed to be changed to avoid any prospect of firing upon a friendly or neutral target. The amended rule required a positive visual sighting of the target before a Harpoon missile launch. This normally entailed the despatch of one of the embarked helicopters.
Economies of scale
Close liaison between the two project offices enabled some very significant cost savings. Two instances come to mind: where purchases were authorised before formal approval was obtained by higher financial authority in Treasury and Finance. In both cases urgency was involved so the RAN could benefit from very large orders placed by the US DoD. Both emanated from Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan and the earlier Iranian revolution resulting in a higher state of military tension.
The first involved the Harpoon missile order where we piggy-backed on the US order, resulting not only in cheaper missiles (then costing in the order of US$1 million each), but earlier delivery. This, however, backfired on our project when the ADF diverted delivery to the RAAF for deployment in the P3C Orion aircraft.
The second example involved the LM 2500 gas turbines. Although then Prime Minister Fraser’s public announcement one Sunday night in 1977 of the purchase of a third FFG (later to be commissioned as Sydney) caught everyone by surprise (including both project teams), we had anticipated at least two more RAN FFGs would be acquired, and had placed orders accordingly.
20 mm Vulcan Phalanx CIWS
Again this was a first for the RAN, and whether the system would be an effective defensive weapon of last resort had yet to be proven. There were ‘expert sceptics’ who believed an incoming missile, exploding at close range as a result of impacting a curtain of lead bullets, would cause even greater damage to the FFG.
Vulcan Phalanx Close in Weapons system (or when all else fails, have faith in me)
Another risk lay in the UD or Uranium Depleted warheads of the 20 mm bullets. While the system manufacturer and the USN maintained that the ammunition did not constitute a safety issue, others were not so sure, especially when stowed in large numbers in a magazine in the confines of a ship. Vietnam War veterans had been given assurances by the US DoD and successive Australian governments that Agent Orange was a safe insecticide and later a safe herbicide. That falsehood was to add doubt to the assurances given regarding UD ammunition at the time. Decades later I am not aware of any cancers attributed to exposure to this type of ammunition, but warnings remain regarding inhaling any fumes and the risks involved in UD fragments entering the body.
Flight deck extension and strengthening
The original specifications for the fantail or flight deck permitted the operating of helicopters with an all-up weight of 13,000 lbs (approx. 6 tonnes). However, during the build of the first tranche of FFGs the costly decision was made to extend and strengthen the flight deck to enable the frigate to operate and hangar the much heavier S-70 Seahawk helicopter (8.65 tonnes). This modification included the Beartrap haul-down mechanism which enabled flight operations in adverse conditions. Once on deck the helicopter could then be safely hauled forward by a mechanical tow embedded in the deck and secured in either hangar.
Potable water
A non-sexy topic but one that is vital, especially when operating a ship in Australian and contiguous (tropical and sub-tropical) waters with limited or no afloat support as is often the case in the RAN. It is quite conceivable the selection team for the FFG totally overlooked the fact the FFG was designed with wholly inadequate potable water storage. In addition, the ship’s ability to desalinate salt water, a process which requires significant electrical energy, was very limited.
The result was that fresh water required for human consumption and ablutions, including showers and wash basins, the washing of clothes, cooling systems, food preparation and scullery use amounted to less than 50% of that available in the DDGs, Daring class destroyers or the River class frigates. Furthermore, these earlier warships with steam turbines had evaporators which could produce potable water additional to that required for the ships’ propulsion.
It was the shortage of potable water that somewhat perversely determined the size of the ship’s complement as well as the endurance of the ships on operations, especially whenever a replenishment vessel was unavailable. I recall when asked by one Navy Office directorate what we in the project office intended to do to rectify this situation, drawing a sketch of an FFG at sea towing a large water barge with a hose attached. I reactivated that sketch three years later when the same directorate stated they needed 12 berths for junior officers under training, including a recreational space or gunroom by adding a second tow line, this time with a modified 40-foot shipping container mounted on a catamaran hull.
Media and Public Relations
Generally speaking, the Australian project office maintained a low profile attracting little media attention, which was the preferred government and DoD policy at that time. The fact the first four ships were being built in the USA also helped in keeping the media from probing. Occasional factual articles in maritime publications also assisted. On one occasion Jonathan Holmes, then a senior journalist with ABC Four Corners programme, was granted access to the Canberra project office. His questions were answered with candour and a sense of pride in the project’s process and he departed without any controversial issues surfacing when the programme aired.
On another occasion PMS 399 in person visited Canberra. RADM John Beecher USN agreed to an informal interview with Anne Summers (now Professor) in the back bar of the Hotel Wellington. The Admiral was warned that Anne had a reputation as a formidable interviewer. ‘Not a problem, we’ve far worse in Washington DC’ he responded. The following day the project team held a barbecue at the Cotter Reserve. Somewhat sheepishly the Admiral admitted to a verbal mauling, but had come away physically intact.
In Summary
From the Project Office perspective, the FFGs served the RAN well with a long life averaging 25 years. From my perspective, the single most frustrating and time-wasting element in my 40 months in the Project Office was the need to constantly justify, and often re-justify, the need for various equipment, systems, spare parts and assemblies, ammunition, and training and travel costs of Navy personnel and dependents. My belief is that when a commitment is made to purchase a weapons platform, and a project team is appointed to manage that contract, the incumbent of that position accepts both accountability and responsibility for that project, and is allowed to get on with the job, unhindered.
That is the situation in the US DoD. In the case of the Canberra based FFG project office we found ourselves the meat in the sandwich, constantly chasing funding and meeting the specific timelines associated with the provision of funds from Defence, Finance and Treasury Departments to enable PMS 399 to meet the obligations to a multitude of US government agencies and contractors. Almost five decades later one may well wonder whether the system has changed for the better?
Oh, don’t the days seem lank and long, when all goes right and nothing goes wrong,
And isn’t your life extremely flat, with nothing whatever to grumble at!
W.S. Gilbert.