- Author
- Proud, J.C.R, Commander
- Subjects
- None noted
- Tags
- None noted.
- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- December 1971 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
Long saw that these organisations if established should be co-ordinated to avoid duplication. Talks began in March, and General Sir Thomas Blamey came prominently into the picture. He had seen the value of irregular operations in the Middle East and was anxious that similar bodies should work in New Guinea and the Islands. GHQ SWPA were not so enthusiastic although they appreciated the work being done by the Coastwatchers.
On his own initiative Blamey approved the establishment of the Far Eastern Liaison Office in June 1942. It was charged with carrying out all combat propaganda in SWPA involving lowering of morale in the enemy forces, misleading the enemy regarding our military intentions and influencing native peoples in Japanese occupied areas to give the Allies maximum support in weakening the enemy’s war effort by co-operating with our forces. I was appointed director of FELO.
At the same time the C-in-C arranged for Mott to establish an Australian branch of Special Operations (SOA). Both organisations had their initial HQ in Melbourne.
By July, MacArthur and his chief of Intelligence, Willoughby, accepted the situation and established under Col. C.G. Roberts of the Australian Army the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Its object was to co- ordinate the work of five organisations — the Coastwatchers, SO(A), SI(A), FELO and the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service. The latter had been formed by the government in exile which had been set up in Australia following the occupation of the NEI.
It was not until the end of 1944 that AIB was effectively reactivated when Brigadier K. A. Wills (now Sir Kenneth) was appointed Controller AIS. He, by force of his personality and enthusiasm for the work, and with the strong backing of the C-in-C, welded the separate organisations into an operational whole. He took over in January 1945, with HQ at Hollandia. By this time our efforts were primarily directed to the Moluccas, Borneo and Java. The Americans had set up their own organisations to cover the drive to the Philippines.
In the previous two years there had been co-operation between the four irregular bodies, but this had been achieved by personal relations between the heads of each group rather than imposed from above. FELO personnel were attached to SO(A), now known as the Services Reconnaissance Department, and Coastwatcher field parties to carry out special propaganda functions and supply and communications systems were shared where practicable.
Mention has been made earlier of the general FELO directive. How was it to be achieved? On the overt side the use of propaganda leaflets in native languages and in Japanese was the most obvious way. To cover this, a small nucleus of Japanese experts was recruited and this was later expanded by certain Japanese POWs who agreed to co-operate. At the same time, we had a group of New Guinea and Indonesian personnel to cover the native populations.
Printing of general purpose leaflets was done in Brisbane, but before long, advanced sections were established in forward areas to prepare material particularly designed for the local tactical situation. To ensure accurate dropping (which was essential in areas like New Guinea and the Islands), a team of officers and NCOs was attached to the RAAF and USAF squadrons. These men went on leaflets dropping missions and were briefed to pin point the targets.
This was particularly important for leaflets in Pidgin and Indonesian where specific instructions were given to native villagers with the object of denying their labour to the enemy. On the Kokoda Trail it was later estimated from captured Japanese documents that as a result of these leaflets more than 2,000 Japanese front line troops had to be used as carriers.
But leaflets were not enough in themselves. A much more personal contact had to be established, and FELO was fortunate in having Lieut. Col. G.W.L. (Kassa) Townsend as head of operations. A senior district officer of the New Guinea service, he knew the people well, and was also able to recruit old New Guinea patrol officers and others with an intimate knowledge of the Territory. These officers, with units of specially trained native police boys, were infiltrated behind enemy lines with the object of obtaining intelligence and stiffening the resistance of the local inhabitants to the Japanese occupation forces. Altogether FELO inserted 14 of these field parties.