- Author
- Proud, J.C.R, Commander
- Subjects
- None noted
- Tags
- None noted.
- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- December 1971 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
In a short survey like this it is impossible to list them all, but the work of Lieut (sp) G. A. V. Stanley in the Sepik area, Captain Bob Cole AIF, behind Hollandia and Flight Lieut. MacDonald working with small craft and HDMLs in the Moluccas was outstanding. Stanley was awarded the DSC, Cole the MC and MacDonald the MBE. The use of small craft became more important as we advanced to Morotai and Borneo. At the end of the war FELO had 12 of these vessels working along the coast of Borneo and Sarawak. FELO also had mobile propaganda units equipped with film projectors and radio receivers placed in enemy occupied areas to win over the natives as our troops advanced. Also, front line broadcasting units were attached to the Australian forces to broadcast propaganda material to the enemy but the effectiveness of this was doubtful. In the Japanese army we had the toughest proposition of all, and POWs taken were relatively few.
Lack of space makes it impossible to describe in detail the other operations of FELO, but an important one was the deception plan which, at the request of General Kenney (USAF), was carried out to induce the Japanese to make an air attack on Port Moresby in April 1943. By the use of native agents, leaflets and the international press and radio, the plan succeeded. According to Kenney’s report, the Japanese put over three raids of 75 to 100 planes each. We lost half a dozen Allied planes, the Japanese lost more than 100 fighters and bombers.
All the AIB sections were demobilised at the close of hostilities although FELO still had work to do contacting isolated enemy detachments who had not heard of the surrender, and often still refused to believe it. This was carried out by leaflet drops and broadcast messages from small craft.
Many lessons were learned from both our failures and our successes. One thing was certain: Irregular forces, while they must be given as much freedom of action and method as possible must be co-ordinated from above and be in touch with local operational command. Without this, men and material can be wasted without commensurate results.