Leadership: Admiral Karl Doenitz

Author

Hume, A.R.N., Midshipman, RAN

Subjects

Biographies and personal histories, WWII operations, History - WW2

Tags

U Boats

RAN Ships

None noted.

Publication

March 2006 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)

When the United States entered the war in December 1941, Doenitz predicted they would be lacking in modern anti-submarine warfare platforms, training and effective doctrine to combat the U-boat threat. Based on this assessment, Doenitz launched Operation Paukenschlag (Drum Beat), an offensive against Allied shipping on the eastern seaboard of the United States. Consisting of five U-boats, and supported by newly developed long-range supply submarines, they were able to sink over 750,000 tons of Allied shipping in less than two months.

The foresight and audacity shown by Doenitz in conducting this offensive showed him to be leader capable not only of directing forces in a specialised field of operations, but who also had a sound grasp of turning the strategic shortcomings of an adversary into a tactical advantage.

His relationship with his subordinates and seniors?

Doenitz was an advocate of leadership through personal interaction and took a ‘hands-on’ approach to many aspects of his command. Due to the pre-war limitations placed on  German  submarine  production numbers, Doenitz concentrated on the training and tactics of his crews to maximize the effect of his few available units. He placed an emphasis on training his crews in warlike conditions whenever possible. Officers and sailors alike took pride in their heightened level of capability that the intensity and relevance of this instruction produced. Doenitz’s training, dedication and professionalism created a strong feeling of confidence in his abilities from his subordinates and superiors alike. This confidence allowed him the free rein he required to employ to maximum effect the U-boats under his command.

His intellectual qualities

Although Doenitz was an unrepentant believer in Nazi ideology, he did not allow this to bias his tactical and strategic analysis. He applied sound logic and lateral thinking when evaluating Allied strengths and vulnerabilities, and in finding ways in which to exploit them. He had the rare ability to convert military theory gained from recent experience into viable tactics for use by his U-boats.

Doenitz and the course of history

The offensive operations of Doenitz’s U-boats were arguably the largest threat to an Allied victory in Europe. His direction of the U-boat war was nearly successful in isolating Great Britain. If not for the slow but steady advances in Allied ASW technology, this blockade could quite possibly have stymied the Allies’ ability to launch a western offensive for several years and perhaps not at all.

After U-boats were forced from the Atlantic, Doenitz still had a role to pay in Germany’s future. In 1945, he was made Führer of the Reich on the authority of Hitler’s last will and testament. During his twenty days in power, Doenitz focused his efforts on ensuring the remnants of the German forces to the Allies, rightly fearing reprisals from Soviet troops. Although Doenitz later defended the Nazi ideology, he was not a fanatic, and the support shown to his U-boat crews was applied to a nearly-defeated German people. However, the Allied powers refused to recognise any new government and on 23 May 1945, Doenitz and his administration were captured and arrested by British forces. He was later convicted of War Crimes at the Nuremburg Trials for having issued controversial orders regarding the rescuing of survivors at sea, and served ten years in Spandau Prison.

Conclusion:

The focus of a commander in the modern battlefield is often based on managing subject matter experts to achieve specific tasks in support of a wider strategic aim. Doenitz monitored and directed his forces at all levels, which is seemingly an uncommon trait in modern commanders. This allowed his forces to achieve a decisiveness rarely seen in the maritime environment. He was given complete discretion in nearly all facets of U-boat operations and was an advocate of fighting ‘smarter, not harder’. His ability to identify and exploit the weaknesses of his enemies came close to altering the outcome of the entire Second World War. The courage, ingenuity and fighting spirit he imbued in the German U-boat arm showed on their impact on the European theatre, and thus the wartime actions of Doenitz relevant model of leadership today

The most valuable lesson we can derive from Doenitz’s wartime leadership is aptly summarised in his memoirs: ‘We shall derive knowledge for the future only if we recognise our past failures and admit them’. Doenitz died of natural causes on 24 December 1980, a revered and respected naval officer the world over.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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