- Author
- Baston, P.C., BEng (Hons), Sub-Lieutenant, RAN
- Subjects
- History - pre-Federation
- Tags
-
- RAN Ships
- None noted.
- Publication
- April 1992 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)
The following year saw significant changes in the British posture. Gold strikes in Victoria and New South Wales started a gold rush and the population rose rapidly. As a consequence, the demand for stronger naval protection increased. By 1853, six small, poorly armed ships were stationed on the Australian Station.
Deterioration in British-Russian relations, and the advent of the Crimean War, focused attention on the inadequacy of the ships on the Australian Station. Sightings of Russian ships in the Pacific forced the states to plan for their own coastal defences.
The Australian Squadron
Increasing pressure on the British government forced the Admiralty to agree to increasing the naval assets on the Australian Station. On 25 March 1859, Commodore William Loring, RN hoisted his blue pennant aboard HM frigate IRIS, and thus the Australian Squadron of the Royal Navy came into being. As Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron. However, this did not result in an increased naval presence and the colonists were disappointed. The few ships in the squadron were old and neglected, and the costs of maintenance caused the Squadron to become a naval backwater.
Colonial Naval Defence Act (1865)
Britain was conscious of the increasing cost of the Empire and its defence, and hinted that it should be relieved of some of the burden. In 1862 the House of Commons passed a resolution stating ‘Colonies exercising the right of self government ought to be able to undertake the main responsibility of providing their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence’’. This resolution was then enacted in 1865 to be the Colonial Naval Defence Act.
This invitation to establish local forces invoked little response from the states, with only token ships being built. Victoria was the largest builder with a turret ship CERBERUS.
Pursuing this idea of user pays, the Admiralty in 1869 proposed to establish a permanent Australian naval force with the states paying half of the cost. This was rejected.
Later, a report published in 1879 based naval policy upon leaving offensive operations to the Australia Squadron, based at Sydney. The protection of maritime trade and inshore defence with torpedo boats and gun emplacements were to be the responsibility of the state, and that they be manned by Australians. This plan also failed to be accepted.
The proposal of 1869 was revised and again put forward in 1881, and a Royal Commission in the same year supported the proposal, yet it was again rejected. The states, disunited, independently built up their own naval forces, and hence by 1884, five separate naval forces existed for the defence of Australia.
Tired and frustrated by the Australian colonies inaction and indecision, the Admiralty appointed Rear Admiral George Tyson, RN as the first Flag Officer commanding the Australia Squadron. His task was to make the states accept responsibility for a greater share in the defence of Australia.
His first attempt was to suggest that the local defence vessels come under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in Australia and that the states all contribute to the cost of construction and maintenance of these vessels. The state governments rejected the idea on the grounds that they would lose control of the port defence vessels for which they were responsible.
A revised scheme in 1885 included the establishment of an Auxiliary Squadron of five 3rd class cruisers. This was also rejected, but the states were agreed that some contribution should be made toward seaward defence. Tyson had achieved part of his objective.
Australian Defence Act (1887)
At the Colonial Conference in London in 1887, discussions were revived on colonial defence, and the Australian Defence Act emerged. This act provided for the existing Australia Squadron to be supplemented by an Auxiliary Squadron as suggested in 1885, but at British expense. For this additional naval protection, the states had agreed to pay five percent of the initial cost plus a yearly subsidy.
The Auxiliary Squadron proved a failure to both parties. The Admiralty was unused to the limited control it had over the Squadron, and the Australian government regarded it as poor value for money, since it provided none of the ‘personal service’ in training Australian seamen. With the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, two ships from the Australian Squadron, one ship from the Auxiliary Squadron, and the South Australian ship PROTECTOR were loaned to the China Squadron. This was the last straw for the Australians who now thought that Australian men and ships should not be sent to fight for causes of no concern to Australia.