The Great Australian Naval Board Scandal of 1913

Author

Cowman, Ian, Dr

Subjects

History - general, Biographies and personal histories

Tags

Australian Naval Board, Royal Australian Navy, Creswell, Hughes-Onslow, Manisty, Thring, Henderson, Clarkson, Millen, Pearce, Patey

RAN Ships

None noted.

Publication

September 1996 edition of the Naval Historical Review (all rights reserved)

Normally this was a highly efficient system when working properly but in the case of the Royal Australian Navy the dockets often disappeared, and ‘one hardly ever knew what had happened’. In fact they all went to the Naval Secretary, who did exactly what he liked in regard to the subjects under discussion, either pigeonholing them, taking the subject to the Minister and obtaining his concurrence, or even issuing instructions to the service “by direction” in his official capacity as Secretary, without the knowledge or consent of the other members of the Board, and sometimes in opposition to their expressed opinions. The sum total of “administrative organisation” at the Navy Office, according to Hughes-Onslow, could have been carried out by a boy of ten years of age in as many minutes…’²²

‘Soon after I arrived Mr. Manisty impressed upon me that he did not believe in Board meetings, and soon the reason was perfectly obvious, as “he had the confidence of the Minister”…the Board was supplanted by a Camarilla; the Minister, Senator Pearce, seldom consulted Naval members; he generally transacted all business with the clerical member, and when he visited the Navy Office would be closeted with him, their rooms adjoining and communicating directly.²³

This view of things was not entirely biased opinion on Hughes-Onslow’s part. From other sources it is clear the organisation and structure of the Royal Australian Navy left a great deal to be desired. This was confirmed by Manisty himself during testimony at an official Senate enquiry held into the closure of the Fitzroy Dock held in November 1913. Under cross-examination Manisty himself admitted that the Board was not working harmoniously, and in fact rarely met – an average of twice a month – and only ‘on special occasions’ for which there were no agenda papers kept. He further admitted that there had only been seven meetings in all since Senator Millen took office in June of 1913.²⁴ So Board meetings were seldom held and when they were held they were irregularly organised. The Naval Secretary frequently delayed proceedings by non-attendance for often half an hour, no minutes were taken of proceedings, and as a result the Naval Secretary ‘took such action as he thought fit, signing the letters ‘by direction’, members of the Naval Board not being acquainted with any of it. In effect there was no Board control at all. What existed then was an “imperium imperio”, composed of two people, one a politician with no service knowledge, and the other ‘with only official knowledge of the service.’ There can be no question that this constituted a parody of naval administration, and was a bountiful illustration of the vagaries of Australian political control over the services, for under this system even ‘enlightened despotism’ had the potential to create abuse’.²⁵

Another “method” of Senator Pearce had an exasperating effect upon the Board. When we all agree upon some point, and he disagreed owing to political pressure, he would cease to be President of the Naval Board, put the docket in his pocket, go over to Victoria Barracks, convert himself into “Minister of Defence” and simply tell the Board off! Anyhow it shows the utter farce and rubbish of “Naval Board” control.²⁶

Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence in support of the Hughes-Onslow position was the Royal Commission called later in 1918 to investigate irregularities and iniquities committed during the war while the RAN was under Board control. Under the strain of war between 1914 and 1918, this loose and ineffective system expanded tremendously in terms of size and responsibility, yet no fundamental change in structure was ever initiated. By 1918 it was being admitted by the Board and was underwritten by the Commission that organisation had practically ceased to function because of the lack of a proper scheme of control – charges that were originally laid by Hughes-Onslow five years earlier.²⁷

Naval Strategy

Another area of contention between Hughes-Onslow and the Naval Board concerned Australian maritime strategy, and the defence policy to be adopted by Australia. Here the conflict never reached the ears of the politicians. Here too Hughes-Onslow delivered some stinging accusations:

‘….a Navy was produced on clerico-political lines and with disastrous consequence that if any one adventured to suggest any modification of the Henderson Recommendations or something contrary to them it was regarded almost as blasphemous; in fact this document was commonly referred to as the Bible. It appears certain if Admiral Henderson had still been on the scene himself, he would have been willing to listen to strategical and other points of view not originally considered, with a view to modification, but to “the brains” the Bible was sacrosanct, to criticize was heresy, because no intellect or sum of intellects could possibly equal the work of “the brains”.²⁸